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The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known 
to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark up applied by 
bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate 
of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 
1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, 
however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for 
researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent thirty years 
little progress has been made - due principally to the absence of new ideas and 
perspectives. This paper resumes the debate by checking old assumptions, providing 
new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing 
this and in order to assure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by 
using a unique set of twelve construction tender databases from four continents. This 
shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. 
Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for 
future study. 
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An important consideration for bidders when preparing a serious construction tender 
proposal is the likely number and identity of the opponents to be faced. Studies of 
construction companies in the U.S. (Ahmad & Minkarah, 1988) and the UK (Shash, 
1993), for example, have found this to be one of the three most important factors that 
conditions most bidding decisions. Clearly, any relevant information will be useful 
when making the decision to bid (d2b) and in strategically setting the bid price to 
increase the probability of winning the contract and making sufficient profit. 
There is also strong evidence that some tender results, or at least their probability 
of occurring, have systematic differences depending on the number of bidders (N) 
involved. For example, high values of N tend to increase the correlation between the 
mean bid and the high and low bids in collective bid tender forecasting models 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012; Shrestha & Pradhananga, 2010; Skitmore, 1981b) 
and the effect of the winner’s curse (Capen et al., 1971, Skitmore, 2002). N has also 
recently been shown to be proportional to the amplitude of the bid standard deviation 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015b). Moreover, N plays an important role in 
combinatorial auctions, with high N increasing computational complexity when 
trying to find the best combination of winners (Fukuta & Ito, 2007; Sandholm, 
2000). 
The traditional approach to anticipating N in practice is through personal 
experience of the past participation rate of bidders mostly in terms of project 
characteristics (e.g., owner, type and size) and nearby location (Ballesteros-Pérez, et 
al., 2010; Fu, 2004). Attempts to forecast N more systematically by mathematic 
models have met with little success. The most popular of these have been to resort to 
a probabilistic approach by treating N as a statistical variable. Friedman (1956), for 
example, suggested that N might follow a Poisson distribution. To a lesser extent, 
similar approaches have been tried in forecasting the identity of bidders, or a group 
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of specific key competitors that might enter a future tender, but with even less 
success (Skitmore, 1986). 
The debates in the early years became very intense at times, with studies proving 
and refuting different properties seemingly exhibited by N in specific contexts, 
countries or just according to the nature of the work involved. By the late 1980s, 
however, the controversies just stopped without a resolution as researchers gradually 
ran out of ideas and enthusiasm. 
The purpose here is to revive this work by revisiting the major achievements 
made during the period 1956-1986, along with some untested later ideas and propose 
a new, improved, model to describe the statistical distribution of N. In doing this, a 
complete and varied set of twelve construction tender databases from around the 
world is analysed for the purpose of generalisation. The result is a critical view of 
past research while stimulating again a productive discussion on a subject that, as 
previously acknowledged, is of considerable importance from both owner and 
bidders’ standpoint and strongly linked to other tender outcomes. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, a thorough but 
summarised literature review is provided. This is followed in Materials and Methods 
by an outline of the main features and countries of origin of the twelve databases and 
the subsequent research methodology. Next, the Calculations section tests the 
suitability of a variety of general statistical distributions for modelling N, the effect 
of contract size and the development of a composite two-distribution model for N. 
The Results section then provides a final comparison of the models, confirming the 
superiority of the new composite model. The Discussion and Conclusions sections 
summarise the work, posing several new research questions and identifying other 
paths for future study. The American term “(procurement or reverse) auction” and 





There have been several thorough reviews of the effect of N on auction results (e.g., 
Dyer et al., 1989; Levin and Ozdenoren, 2004; Hu, 2011) and these will not be 
recounted here. Instead, we are concerned with the statistical nature of N as a 
precursor to its potential prediction. It is well known in both practice and theory that 
N generally varies with the project type and size (e.g., Azman, 2014; Drew and 
Skitmore, 2006), client and specific location (Al-Arjani, 2002; Benjamin, 1969) and 
even with market conditions (Ngai et al., 2002; Skitmore, 1981a).  
Forecasting its value in advance, however, is more problematic, the earliest 
treatment being Friedman (1956), who suggested a variety of methods for estimating 
its expected value. One way is to use the often little information available about a 
company’s competitors’ intentions in combination with its managers’ experience - an 
approach reiterated by Rubey and Milner (1966) with especial emphasis on the 
contract type and size involved. 
Another suggestion is to exploit the statistical relationship between N and 
contract size (the complete budget to carry out the project) (Friedman, 1956), a 
reasonable enough assumption at that time of open tendering in the U.S., as larger 
projects are generally associated with larger (dollar) profits and therefore likely to 
attract more bidders. Empirical studies attempting this are quite limited and 
inconclusive, however. Gates (1967) and Wade and Harris (1976) have applied the 
method to U.S. data, producing generally weak predictive results. Other empirical 
U.S. research is even less supportive, finding no significant linear relationship 
between N and contract size, nor between contract size and the number of suppliers 
and subcontractors involved (e.g. Sugrue, 1977). Skitmore’s (1986) analysis of UK 
construction auctions, however, where selective tendering is the norm, surprisingly 
found a weak to moderate correlation between N and contract size. A possible reason 
for the general lack of correlation in the U.S. suggested by Park (1966) is that the 
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relationship between N and contract size may be nonlinear. Although this has yet to 
be tested with U.S. data, Skitmore's (1986) UK analysis found the correlation to be 
certainly more apparent when contract size was transformed to a log scale. 
The only other empirical approach to forecasting N is Skitmore's (1981b) study 
of several international tender datasets from different time periods, which identified 
an apparent relationship between N and market conditions. However, no 
mathematical model was developed for this. Today, the general conclusion is that 
using some measure of contract size will provide the best means of estimating N and 
certainly an advancement on considering it to be purely random (Ballesteros-Pérez & 
Skitmore, 2014), a view that has been dominant since Rickwood (1972). 
For statistical applications involving N, besides estimating its expected value, it 
is important to be able to make some assumptions concerning its probability density 
function (pdf). In addition to bidding strategies, this has important ramifications in 
Auction and Game theory (Klemperer, 2004), driven by the different outcomes it 
produces on several types of auctions formats and under different types of valuations 
used by bidders of the auctioned items. Nevertheless, there is a long list of proposed 
candidates. These include the normal (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2013a, 2014), uniform 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2013b), gamma (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980), Laplace 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015a) and Weibull (Ballesteros-Pérez & Skitmore, 2014).  
Of particular interest is the Poisson distribution, considered by Friedman (1956), 
as likely to “furnish a good fit” for N values, reasoning that similar individuals 
independently deciding whether or not to bid for a particular item is equivalent to N 
following the binomial distribution which, when the average of the number of bids is 
a small fraction of the total possible, is well approximated by the Poisson. This was 
later seemingly confirmed by Keller and Bor's (1978) empirical analysis of the 
bidding patterns of a significant number of similar construction contracts in which 
their results agreed with the Poisson distribution. In contrast, Skitmore’s (1986) 
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empirical analysis of three sets of UK construction tenders found no significant fit 
with the Poisson (N=51, 2.6x , sd=2.1,   7.20
2
4  ; N=218, 7.5x , sd=1.1, 
  4.16
2
8  ; N=373, 1.5x , sd=3.8,   4.31
2
8  ). Meanwhile, others making use of, 
for example, U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Statistical summary of 1976 to 1978 oil 
tract auctions, found N might follow not only a distribution different from the 
Poisson but even bimodal distributions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980). 
On being criticized by other researchers on theoretical grounds, Friedman then 
modified his original assertion to the distribution of the residuals of a regression 
between N and contract size (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Dougherty, & Lohrenz, 1986). 
Others, however, have suggested the normal distribution to be a better option to 
reflect the random variability of such residuals – a point supported empirically by 
Skitmore (1986) for contract size with and without logarithmic transformation. 
Since then, a compromise solution has been to consider the number of bidders as 
a purely stochastic variable in experimental settings (McAfee & McMillan, 1987) or 
as a fixed value in Game and Auction theory (Harstad et al., 1990), although quite 
surprisingly the Poisson model has endured since the very first and celebrated 
compilation of auction and bidding models from Stark and Rothkopf (1979) and 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) to modern and current online auctions (Bajari & 
Hortacsu, 2003). 
A completely different approach to estimating N is to try to identify who the 
actual bidders might be. As with horse racing, where the same horses often race 
against each other, many contractors tend to prefer construction work of a certain 
type, size and location and therefore can be expected to bid against each other quite 
regularly. In the U.S., however, as Morin and Clough (1969) note, it is quite usual 
for the same bidder to submit proposals for different types of work. A contractor’s 
decision to bid (d2b) is also limited by the number of contracts that can be managed 
7 
 
at any one time (Skitmore, 1988). Both of these factors lead to a situation where the 
same contractors bid less frequently against each other than might be otherwise 
imagined, making the prediction of their presence on a single auction a very difficult 
task in the absence of ‘inside’ information (which in itself is also difficult to obtain 
as being tantamount to collusion). An alternative is to simply “go and look”. 
Skitmore's (1987) research in the U.S., for example, identified several informal 
methods used by contractors to assess the state of opponents’ order book, including 
flying over their main compound to see the amount of machinery lying idle! 
The use of statistical methods is possible, with Wade and Harris (1976) for 
example suggesting to treat the identities of several bidders and their groups 
probabilistically, but there are difficulties in this, particularly involving the identities 
of those from whom the forecasting company does not have any information. This, 
has led the tendering theory literature to classify the potential competitors as “key” 
and “strangers” (Skitmore, 1986). 
Since 1986, however, there has been no further work in this area (Ballesteros-
Pérez & Skitmore, 2014) and we will leave its consideration for a separate paper on 
the topic. Similarly, with the exception of additional studies such as by Athias and 
Nuñez (2009), Skitmore (2008) and Costantino et al. (2011) there has been no 
further empirical work concerning the statistical nature of N and therefore previous 
assumptions will not be considered further here. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Tender datasets 
In order to make a thorough analysis of the distribution of N, a comprehensive and 
representative set of construction tender databases is needed. However, such 
databases are generally difficult to obtain because there are very few published in the 
regular scientific construction literature mostly due to their length. Therefore, an 
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intensive and detailed search was carried out and access was obtained to documents 
only available in printed form, mostly in MSc and PhD theses where the original 
bidding data was complete and unprocessed. This resulted in the collection of twelve 
databases - some in the original author’s scanned form and others requiring a visit to 
the respective university repository. 
The twelve databases contain construction bidding data from four continents: 
Europe (United Kingdom and Spain), America (United States), Asia (Hong Kong) 
and Oceania (Australia), all featuring different types of construction work from 
different time periods. Table 1 summarizes the most important aspects of each 
database. 
For the sake of clarity, the tender databases are referred to by the numerical 
identifier stated in the column marked “ID”. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
In general, the sample described in Table 1 is considered sufficiently representative, 
since the twelve databases analysed encompass different works such as: buildings 
(housing, aeronautics, schools, hostels, police and fire stations), civil works (waste 
water treatment plants, railways) and services (specialized and general). All decades 
from the sixties until now are represented either completely or partially by at least 
one dataset and their sizes are large enough (from tens to hundreds of contracts) to 
carry out thorough statistical analyses. Furthermore, concerning the variable number 
of bidders, the databases range from low (mean N of around 5) to high (around 31) 
numbers of bidders, whose dispersion values are more or less scattered (see standard 
deviation column), have different levels of positive skewness (no dataset has 
negative skewness), as well as different levels of positive and negative kurtosis. 
Finally, it is also noted that, among the twelve databases, the six from the United 
Kingdom and Australia used selective tendering, that is, the owner invites only 
certain bidders and therefore sets an upper-bound on the value of N. However, the 
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results obtained later seem to be very similar for both open and selective tendering 
processes. 
 
Outline of Methodology  
In the next two sections, several factors that either directly or indirectly affect N are 
identified from the twelve databases. First, the analysis begins with an extensive 
comparison of the goodness of fit of a range of common statistical distributions and 
an attempt to deduce why some distributions perform better than others. Next, the 
relationship between N and contract size is analysed in both natural and logarithmic 
scales, and studied to see how predictably the statistical mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis vary when plotted against contract size, and some general 
behaviour patterns are provided. Finally, a new model for describing the statistical 
variation of N is presented along with the justification of its main assumptions - that 
both the frequency of contract sizes and that the population of potentially interested 
participating bidders are log-normally distributed. As is eventually demonstrated 
from the large variety of statistical curve shapes that can stem from this model and 
the thorough statistical distribution fit tests performed, the model represents a 
significant step forward in this topic. The next section is divided into three 
subsections describing these analyses in more detail. 
 
Calculations 
Comparison of goodness of fit of standard statistical distributions 
Of the many statistical distributions proposed to date to model N (Poisson, normal, 
gamma, Weibull, Laplace, etc.) no clear single distribution has yet been found, with 
different studies making use of databases with different characteristics that are not 
always identified. To analyse the twelve databases, a χ² test is applied to every 
distribution, which are then ranked according to the number of times the sum of the 
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squared residuals are below the critical χ²α values (using three levels of significance 
α=1%, 5% and 10%) and the p-values. The more times the actual χ² values are below 
the critical χ²α values (from 0 to 3 on average), the lower is the p-value (from 0 to 1, 
on average) and hence the better fit of the distribution. 
The range of distributions tested is basically restricted to the location-scale 
family, as the parameters that define these distributions have true physical meaning, 
improving the understanding of the underlying distribution involved. In addition, the 
gamma and Weibull distributions were also tested because of their prevalence in the 
literature. Of the location-scale distributions tested, seven symmetrical distributions 
(skewness=0) are of particular interest: the uniform (kurtosis close to -1.2), raised 
cosine (kurtosis close to -0.6), normal (kurtosis 0.0), logistic (kurtosis 1.2), 
hyperbolic secant (kurtosis 2.0), Laplace (kurtosis 3.0) and Cauchy (kurtosis 
undefined). These latter distributions are chosen to map in detail the level of kurtosis 
that might better fit the N distribution in terms of either platykurtic or leptokurtic 
behaviour. Asymmetrical forms of these seven distributions are also tested by 
transforming the N values into log N values (i.e., for testing against the log-uniform, 
log-raised cosine, log-normal, log-logistic, log-hyperbolic secant, log-Laplace and 
Log-Cauchy distributions) to map positive skewness with different kurtosis levels 
and, by using the N
2
 values to test for negative asymmetries with different kurtoses 
(i.e., square-uniform, square-raised cosine, square-normal, square-logistic, square-
hyperbolic secant, square-Laplace and square-Cauchy). Furthermore, the Poisson 
distribution is also tested with the natural, logarithmic and square N values. A 
flexible array of means and variances calculated by the method of moments are 
therefore tested using location-scale distributions and a representative grid of 
skewness and kurtosis levels tracked and checked, amounting to 24 combinations in 
all, plus the Weibull and gamma distributions, for each of the twelve databases. It is 
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also to be noted that, despite most distributions being continuous, a discretization of 
the X values (N values) is performed by obtaining the pdf f(x=N), from the 
cumulative distribution function, F(x=N), by the simple calculation: f(x) = F(x+0.5) 
- F(x-0.5). 
Table 2 and Figure 1 give the results for the four best distribution fits (normal, 
log-normal, logistic and log-logistic) together with the Poisson and the Laplace 
distributions. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
On average, the log-normal distribution produces the highest number of times the χ² 
values are below the critical three χ²α values and the lower p-value, although the 
normal, logistic and log-logistic are also quite close. 
These results are not very useful, however, as the fit is not good for any distribution, 
even the log-normal. That this may be due to the absence of another influencing 
factor is an issue taken up in the next section. 
 
Improving accuracy by considering contract size 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
Table 3 gives the regression equations of N with contract size (in terms of the mean 
bid, Bm) for the twelve datasets. This indicates the existence of a weak correlation in 
most cases, irrespective of whether Bm is calculated from the natural or logarithmic 
bids. This may be due to two causes. First, there may be a large variation in N values 
obscuring an underlying correlation. Second, the distribution Bm observed in every 
database may not be uniform, so there is an uneven distribution of the N values on 
the X-axis. 
To observe the variations in the N distribution values, one approach is to place 
the auctions in ascending order of log contract size (from lower to higher Bm) and 
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plot the first four moments (mean (μ), standard deviation (σ) skewness (γ) and 
kurtosis (κ)) of groups of N values as shown in Figure 2. 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
As Newell and Hancock (1984) note, for practical purposes in statistical inference, 
estimates of γ and κ for sample sizes below 50 can indicate the underlying statistical 
distribution is normal when it is not. Therefore rolling groups of 50 N values are 
taken. That is, the moments of N values from the auctions ranked 1 to 50 are first 
recorded. Then the moments of N values from the auctions ranked 2 to 51 are 
recorded, and the process continued until reaching the last ordered auction. Four of 
the datasets do not contain sufficient auctions to do this and are therefore missing 
from Figure 2. 
Even a window width of 50 auctions causes high oscillations in the γ and κ 
estimates. To clarify the situation, the rule of thumb of usual practice is followed in 
which only values outside the range of ±1 are taken to be sufficient evidence to 
conclude the underlying distribution is either skewed or platy/leptokurtic. 
As Figure 2 shows, when considered in terms of contract size, with very few 
exceptions the γ and κ estimates are quite close to zero. Figure 3 provides a first 
approximation why this might be the case. This contains several interesting features 
that need to be highlighted since it mirrors some aspects found in Figure 2.  
< Insert Figure 3 here > 
First, it is quite logical to think that, irrespective of the X axis (contract size) being 
represented in natural or logarithmic values, contract sizes that are very small or very 
large will fail to attract bidders, since bidders can make little profit in the former 
case, and no qualified bidder could submit a proposal in the latter case. This being 
the case, μ will increase initially from zero until it reaches a zone with relatively 
stable maximum N values, after which it will decrease asymptotically back to zero. 
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Second, it is expected that the σ curve will behave similarly. However, as Figure 2 
shows, in almost all cases there seems to be a gap between the maximum μ and σ 
(identified as Δ). The reason for this is still to be researched. 
Third, the γ and κ curves take on high values when the μ and σ curves are closer 
to zero. The reason is that when N is extremely low, the N distribution has to be as 
shown in the bottom left corner of Figure 3, which is remarkably asymmetrical and 
leptokurtic since the highest density and cumulative probability will remain 
between 10  N . On the other hand, when the N curve has γ and κ close to zero, 
the distribution that models N can be assumed nearly normal. However, extremes of 
high γ and κ are rarely observed, since we can only have a glimpse of those atypical 
situations with very small and/or large contract sizes and, since they are quite scarce, 
it is difficult to accurately estimate the γ and κ values involved. 
Nevertheless, Databases 4, 7 and 10 in Figure 2 seem to support the assumptions 
made above about γ and κ. On the other hand, when dissecting the variation in μ, σ, γ 
and κ along the contract size dimension, the curve modelling N (bottom half of 
Figure 3) for the rest of databases should be close to the normal distribution, as γ and 
κ are close to zero. 
 
Model proposed 
Hossein (1977) found contract size could be modelled by the exponential 
distributions, while a similar study by Skitmore (1986) however found the log-
normal distribution to be more appropriate. Here, two distributions are checked for 
fit - the log-normal distribution and the Pareto distribution. The former because it has 
been found to outperform the exponential and the latter because it is closely related 
to the exponential distribution but has two parameters as has the log-normal. It is 
noted that both the Pareto and log-normal are alternative distributions for describing 
the distributions of sizes which abound in natural, physical, economic, and social 
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systems (Malevergne et al., 2011). Fat-tail distributions, such as the log-normal and 
the Pareto distribution have historically competed for describing with higher 
accuracy some generating processes and hard-to-distinguish tail properties 
(Malevergne et al., 2011), and this is the reason why both have been compared here. 
The results in comparing both distributions are presented in Table 4, with a 
representation of the best log-normal distributions found in Figure 4. As noted from 
Table 4, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate the log-normal distribution to 
generally provide the best fit, even when the datasets seem rather erratic – probably 
as a consequence of a tender dataset that did not include the complete range of tender 
sizes. 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
< Insert Figure 4 here > 
On the other hand, a parallel theoretical debate has quite recently emerged 
concerning the use of a power-law distribution or a log-normal distribution to model 
firm size (Segarra & Teruel, 2012), as both appear to provide a close fit with real 
data. If we assume that the number of potentially interested bidders is a fraction or 
proportion of the population of companies found in a particular area and within a 
particular market, then the number of bidders should also follow a log-normal 
distribution with similar location (mean) and scale (variance) parameters, but 
differing on the Y-axis order of magnitude when representing absolute values, 
instead of frequency values. This is because the number of potentially interested 
bidders would be lower when representing the number of companies on the Y-axis 
compared to the total number of companies by size, but both should probably look 
quite similar when representing their pdfs, since they would then represent 
proportions. Therefore, a model is proposed that endeavours to take advantage of the 
log-normal distributions: (1) the distribution of contract size and (2) the distribution 
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of potentially interested bidders, both considered as log-normal, but with different 
location and scale parameters (μ1 and σ²1, and μ2 and σ²2, respectively).  
What this model tries to represent is that, if there is a different number of bidders 
who might submit a bid for a future tender as a function of the contract size, and the 
number of contract size opportunities is known (both being variables well 
represented by different log-normal distributions), the calculation of the N 
distribution curve should be according to the representation of Figure 5. 
< Insert Figure 5 here > 
In particular, Figure 5 represents how, in order to calculate the probabilities 
associated to every possible value of N (Ni from 0 to +∞), it is only required to add 
up the two probability bands in the distribution of contract sizes (log-normal whose 
location and scale parameters are μ1 and σ1) that are delimited by the two pairs of X 
values from the distribution of the number of interested bidders (log-normal whose 
location and scale parameters are μ2 and σ2) whose respective Y values correspond to 
that specific Ni ±0.5. For instance, in Figure 5 we want to calculate the probabilities 
of finding Ni=4 in a database. Despite the number of bidders Ni being natural 
numbers, we need to assume that the number of interested bidders distribution will 
correspond to a band of Y values between 4.5 and 5.5 (as represented on the right Y 
axis). Those two Y values each correspond to another two different X values by 
horizontal intersection first, and then by vertical intersection, in the same log-normal 
distribution describing the number of interested bidders. But once these four X 
values are identified, they also define the vertical probability bands within the log-
normal distribution of contract sizes that, on being summated, will result in the 
probability of finding Ni=4 in the database. 
Generally speaking, Figure 5 highlights that the final N distribution is affected by 
the number of bidders that would submit a bid if there was an occasion to do so as 
well as by the number of times each contract size occurs. In other words if, for each 
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possible N value it is known that there are a fixed number of interested bidders (by 
means of curve 2, and ±0.5 to discretized the distribution), and if the frequency of 
that range of contract sizes is calculated (by means of curve 1), then the same 
frequency will be equivalent to the number of times that that N will be found in the 
final N distribution.  
Concerning the five parameters to be estimated in the model (μ1, σ1, μ2, σ2 and 
Nmax), the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of contract sizes 
(parameters μ1 and σ1) can be directly obtained by calculating the first and second 
moments from the series of all tender Bm (bid average) values found in a database; 
Nmax can be set to the maximum Ni value found in the database (or slightly above); 
whereas the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the number of 
interested bidders (parameters μ2 and σ2) cannot be directly estimated (unless 
extensive and time-consuming field research is carried out for estimating the 
distribution of nearby firm sizes with potential interest in the type of works 
contained in the database under study). Therefore, it is recommended that, when 
looking for the best combination of parameter values, μ1, σ1 and Nmax are calculated 
as suggested above, while parameters μ2 and σ2 are set according to a simple two-
variable numerical optimization approach for providing the best overall distribution 
fit. In this connection, according to the multiple combinations of these five parameter 
values, the broad range of mathematical shapes that this model distribution can take 
is represented in Figure 6. 
< Insert Figure 6 here > 
As can be seen, the model is able to provide a number of statistical curve shapes 
changing the γ from positive to negative, or reaching higher levels of κ near the N=0 
and Nmax values. For the sake of simplicity however, the most common cases are 
identified and framed in the thick line on the top rows of Figure 6. This distribution 





Comparison of standard statistical distributions considering contract size 
In summary, Table 2 gives the best results for a complete comparison of several 
statistical distributions irrespective of contract size. However, Figure 3 suggests that, 
within a certain range of contract sizes, N is quite close to a normal distribution. It is 
also apparent that working with narrower intervals of contract sizes also leads 
normal-like distributions for N, this being the case with the three central images 
depicted on the top row of Figure 6, where narrow contract size intervals have 
necessarily quite small variance values from the distribution of contract size 
opportunities (σ²1→0) when compared to the variance of the number of potentially 
interested bidders (σ²2), forcing σ²1<<σ²2. 
To examine this further, the Table 2 analysis is repeated but with non-rolling 
groups of contract sizes as shown in Table 5.  
< Insert Table 5 here > 
As can be seen, the best pdf for N is now the normal distribution with both indicators 
(the number of times the χ² values are below the critical χ²α values, and the p-values) 
significantly improved. However, this improvement also applies to all the other 
distributions tested, since the two indicators are approximately between 30% and 
60% better on average for all of them when compared with the results in Table 2. It 
is shown, therefore, although the best approximation of N is the normal distribution, 
the log-normal, logistic and log-logistic are not far behind. 
 
Model validation 
To test the new five parameter (μ1, σ1, μ2, σ2 and Nmax) model, it is first effectively 
reduced to a two-parameter model by forcing μ1 and σ1 to take on the values of the 
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actual (log-normal) contract size distributions represented in Figure 4 (that were 
directly obtained by the method of moments) and having the Nmax values vary within 
a nearby range to the actual maximum N values observed in the twelve databases, 
leaving the only remaining parameters μ2 and σ2 to be estimated. This is done by a 
simple two-dimensional optimization process to find the values that minimize the 
actual χ² values. The results are shown in Table 6 and the model curves illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
< Insert Figure 7 here > 
As can be seen, the model outperforms all the distributions tested so far, even when 
taking narrower intervals of contract size (although the improvements are only 
around 10% in this latter case). However, both approaches have different aims: the 
model only provides a better explanation of the distribution of N, while breaking 
down the series of N values by more compact contract sizes only reduces the amount 
of randomness when trying to describe the unexplained variation of N. 
 
Summary 
Many distributions have been compared in this study by means of multiple chi-
square tests performed on twelve databases. Therefore, in order to highlight potential 
differences between the performance of these statistical distributions, it is convenient 
to summarise the results in a single ranking table. 
This is the aim of Table 7, which presents the average and standard deviation 
results (the latter not presented earlier to avoid confusion with other variables 
involved) of the number of times the sum of the squared residuals are below the 
critical χ²α values (from 3 –good fit- to 0 –bad fit–) and the p-values (from 0 –perfect 
fit– to 1 –worst fit–). Table 7 distributions have been ordered in descending order of 
the average p-values but, as can be seen, some distributions nearly tie when taking 
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< Insert Table 7 here > 
The consequence of a lower p-value is directly indicative of a loss of accuracy when 
modelling the actual distribution of the N values, and this table shows how the new 
model outperforms (on average) other common distributions. However, it is noted 
that the standard deviation values obtained, even without the need for carrying out 
ANOVA tests, denote potential overlaps in the means of the p-values, particularly 
among the top-ranked distributions. Fortunately, the χ²α has zero variance for the 
new model, which indicates that the model has provided, without exception, what 
may be considered a reasonable approximation in the twelve databases. This is not 
the case with the other models. 
Further discussion of Table 7 is provided in the next section. 
 
Discussion 
From the results obtained in the previous sections, it is clear that the contract size 
distribution within each database is close to log-normal and strongly conditions N. 
The direct comparison of many statistical distributions (partially shown in Table 1 
and Figure 1, as well as in Table 7) is also expected to be biased towards the log-
normal distribution. However, as also observed in Tables 5 and 7, the normal 
distribution naturally presents an acceptable fit (closely followed by the log-normal) 
when the contract size effect is considered. Therefore, as with many other such 
goodness-of-fit studies, there is an intermediate situation in which it is difficult to 
distinguish between the suitability of the normal and log-normal distributions. In 
addition, the logistic and log-logistic distributions are also good candidates, since 
they are quite similar in shape to the normal and log-normal distributions 
respectively, although slightly more leptokurtic. This fact is also frequently 
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observed, since the juxtaposed effect of mixing the normal and log-normal 
distributions slightly increases the kurtosis coefficient. 
In summary therefore, in delimiting the potential values of N for a future tender, 
removing the effect of contract size by using only recent past tenders with a similar 
contract size or calculating the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis as in 
Figure 2, is preferable to directly modelling the whole dataset values of N without 
allowing for contract size. On the other hand, as Tables 6 and 7 show, the new model 
provides a better fit than the many other statistical distributions examined, although 
its superiority is not decisive, as indicated by the small differences and high standard 
deviation between p-values in Tables 5, 6 and 7. In addition, the model assumes the 
log-normal distribution representing the expected value of the number of interested 
bidders as fixed, when this curve Y values must necessarily evidence variability 
since, for instance, it seems counter intuitive to state that the number of potentially 
interested bidders for a given contract size is constant, but variable as well. 
 
Conclusions 
Knowing the statistical distribution of the number of bidders, N, for a construction 
contract is important in real-life bidding because it conditions the decision to bid and 
how to set the final bid price so as to increase the probability of winning, but also in 
tendering theory since it affects many related outcomes, such as the correlation 
between the mean and lowest bids or the dispersion of the bid values, which are key 
assumptions of many collective bid tender forecasting models. However, little 
progress has been made despite the many studies from 1956 to 1986 except that there 
are other variables that seem to condition or have a significant correlation with N. 




In this study, a unique set of twelve construction and services tender databases 
from four continents are used for a thorough comparison of many candidate 
statistical distributions with the primary aim of determining which are the most 
accurate and in what conditions. 
The univariate results show the log-normal distribution to be the best fit, while 
the normal distribution provides the best fit when contract size is taken into account. 
These are basic but important outcomes, since many bidding practitioners and 
researchers tend to use the normal distribution without distinction when modelling 
the distribution of bidders, while it is shown here that this distribution is only the 
most accurate when contracts of similar nature of work and economic size are used. 
If these conditions are not fulfilled, then the log-normal distribution is the most 
accurate. 
Next, the expected variation of the N distribution mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis as a function of contract size is analysed in both natural and 
logarithmic scales. The four moments are studied to see how predictably they vary 
when plotted against contract size and some interesting general behaviour patterns 
are provided. For example, most construction tenders operate within a band of 
contract sizes that have low levels of skewness and kurtosis, allowing the use 
normal-like distributions with barely loss of accuracy. However, this situation is no 
longer valid for extremely high or low contract values, since contractors will usually 
have less previous experience with such contracts, when the distribution of N 
becomes strongly positive skewed and peaked. 
Finally, a new model for describing N is presented along with the justification of 
its main assumptions - that both the frequency of contract sizes and that the 
population of potentially interested participating bidders are log-normally 
distributed. As is demonstrated from the large variety of statistical curve shapes that 
can stem from this model and the thorough statistical distribution fit tests performed, 
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the model results are significantly more accurate in modelling the variations in N 
than the other alternatives considered for all 12 datasets examined, including the 
ubiquitous normal distribution which is used in similar studies. 
Despite this, however, it is felt that there is still room for further improvement. 
For instance, research in forecasting the identity of future bidders may, 
paradoxically, shed further light on the issue. There are also new questions 
concerning differences in contract size (value) that exist between the maximum 
expectation and variance of N when represented as a function of contract size. An 
additional question is how to replace the deterministic number of potentially 
interested bidders in the model by a distribution with a random component. 
The result is a critical view of past research while stimulating again a productive 
discussion on a subject that, as previously acknowledged, is of considerable 
importance from both owner and bidders’ standpoint and strongly linked to tender 
outcomes beyond the construction context. 
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ID Database Alias Description 
Tender 
method 
1 UK51 Building-related tenders within the London area with one bidder in common and cover prices Selective 
2 UK272 Construction industry Building Cost Information Service report Selective 
3 UK218 Civil engineering work tenders from the North of England Selective 
4 UK373 Building-related tenders within the London area Selective 
5 US64 Building-related tenders from the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration Open 
6 US50 Building-related tenders from the US Open 
7 HK199 Tenders of buildings for education, police, firemen and hostels in Hong Kong Open 
8 HK261 Tenders from the Hong Kong Administrative Service Department Open 
9 AU152 General contractors' civil engineering works and housing in New South Wales, Australia Selective 
10 AU161 Specialised contractors' civil engineering works and housing in New South Wales, Australia Selective 
11 SP45 Waste Water Treatment Plants and Sewage lines in Catalonia region, Spain Open 
12 SP114 Spanish High-speed Railway Infrastructure Manager (ADIF) tenders Open 
 









1 51 1981-1982 6.235 1.464 0.250 0.241 (Skitmore and Pemberton, 1994) 
2 272 1969-1979 6.140 1.786 0.265 1.009 (Skitmore, 1981b) 
3 218 1979-1982 5.665 2.260 0.497 0.994 (Skitmore, 1986) 
4 373 1976-1977 5.134 1.944 0.124 -0.580 (Skitmore, 1986) 
5 64 1976-1984 6.734 3.108 1.756 4.763 (Brown, 1986) 
6 50 1965-1969 4.680 1.834 0.558 -0.260 (Shaffer and Micheau, 1971) 
7 199 1981-1990 12.724 6.262 0.696 0.497 (Drew, 1995) 
8 261 1991-1996 13.663 7.279 0.654 -0.498 (Fu, 2004) 
9 152 1972-1982 8.651 3.987 0.685 -0.060 (Runeson, 1987) 
10 161 1972-1982 6.273 2.877 1.595 3.531 (Runeson, 1987) 
11 45 2007-2008 14.133 11.108 1.496 1.706 (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. , 2012) 
12 114 2008-2014 31.974 12.082 0.414 -0.345 (Fuentes-Bargues et al. , 2015) 
Table 1. Description of the twelve construction tender databases analysed 
ID Database Critical χ² α  values Poisson Normal 
alias χ²α=0.01 χ²α=0.05 χ²α=0.10 χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value 
1 UK51 18.475 14.067 12.017 30.188 0 1.000 8.736 3 0.728 
2 UK272 21.666 16.919 14.684 57.384 0 1.000 11.061 3 0.728 
3 UK218 21.666 16.919 14.684 16.017 2 0.933 10.136 3 0.660 
4 UK373 21.666 16.919 14.684 31.082 0 1.000 17.886 1 0.963 
5 US64 23.209 18.307 15.987 14.736 3 0.858 18.793 1 0.957 
6 US50 18.475 14.067 12.017 2.077 3 0.045 3.801 3 0.198 
7 HK199 48.278 41.337 37.916 10169.1 0 1.000 49.274 0 0.992 
8 HK261 49.588 42.557 39.087 4602.7 0 1.000 88.747 0 1.000 
9 AU152 30.578 24.996 22.307 78.525 0 1.000 23.064 2 0.917 
10 AU161 27.688 22.362 19.812 79.735 0 1.000 109.893 0 1.000 
11 SP45 34.805 28.869 25.989 1131.92 0 1.000 26.107 2 0.903 
12 SP114 57.342 49.802 46.059 3079.7 0 1.000 54.931 1 0.983 
     
avg. 0.667 0.903 avg. 1.583 0.836 
 
ID LogNormal Logistic LogLogistic Laplace 
χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value 
1 8.951 3 0.744 7.755 3 0.645 7.650 3 0.636 7.022 3 0.573 
2 47.767 0 1.000 10.488 3 0.688 34.870 0 1.000 24.233 0 0.996 
3 50.246 0 1.000 10.160 3 0.662 48.580 0 1.000 20.475 1 0.985 
4 72.666 0 1.000 30.904 0 1.000 82.635 0 1.000 55.608 0 1.000 
5 6.932 3 0.268 15.441 3 0.883 5.708 3 0.161 11.483 3 0.679 
6 1.755 3 0.028 4.194 3 0.243 2.399 3 0.066 244.245 0 1.000 
7 45.495 1 0.980 47.163 1 0.987 49.564 0 0.993 56.750 0 0.999 
8 46.083 1 0.977 109.201 0 1.000 68.904 0 1.000 123.869 0 1.000 
9 16.593 3 0.656 25.550 1 0.957 21.134 3 0.867 28.882 1 0.983 
10 4.721 3 0.019 39.731 0 1.000 3.101 3 0.002 30.176 0 0.996 
11 10.88 3 0.100 26.545 2 0.912 12.467 3 0.178 18.354 3 0.567 
12 55.818 1 0.986 63.802 0 0.998 63.864 0 0.998 87.614 0 1.000 
 
avg. 1.750 0.647 avg. 1.583 0.831 avg. 1.500 0.658 avg. 0.917 0.898 
 
Table 2. Chi-square tests for checking the Poisson, Normal, LogNormal, Logistic, LogLogistic 
and Laplace distribution fit for N 
ID Database Optimal regression curves 
alias X=Bm (natural scale) & Y=N R² X=Bm (log scale) & Y=N R² 
1 UK51 Y=-6E-14X²+7E-07X+5.4185 0.109 Y = 0.2649X²-7.0073X+52.236 0.101 
2 UK272 Y= 1.7382X^0.1001 0.115 Y= -0.1737X²+4.8162X-26.52 0.146 
3 UK218 Y=0.7977LN(X)-3.0126 0.253 Y= 0.7977X-3.0126 0.253 
4 UK373 Y=0.372X^0.2034 0.253 Y=0.0063X^2.6271 0.270 
5 US64 Y=-0.282LN(X)+10.534 0.018 Y=0.0941X²-2.8759X+28.2 0.024 
6 US50 Y=-1E-13X²+8E-07X+4.233 0.038 Y=-0.1128X²+3.2137X-17.948 0.041 
7 HK199 Y=-5E-16X²+1E-08X+12.917 0.012 Y=-0.9458X²+30.389X-230.2 0.052 
8 HK261 Y=-7E-09X+14.658 0.035 Y=-0.9451X²+34.254X-295.73 0.035 
9 AU152 Y=1.6998X^0.1095 0.067 Y=0.1297X^1.5581 0.070 
10 AU161 Y=5.5924EXP(1E-07X) 0.009 Y=0.3815X²-9.0763X+59.735 0.070 
11 SP45 Y=-2E-13X²+4E-06X+5.5083 0.374 Y=1.0237X²-24.343X+151.48 0.297 
12 SP114 Y=-2E-15X²+9E-08X+33.465 0.147 Y=-3.8248X²+125.47X-990.14 0.235 
  
avg. 0.119 avg. 0.133 
Table 3. Regression results between variables Contract size (via Mean bid, Bm) and Number of 
bidders (N) 
ID Database Lognormal 
alias D Dα=0.01 Dα=0.05 Dα=0.10 D<Dα=0.01? D<Dα=0.05? D<Dα=0.10? 
1 UK51 0.074 0.143 0.123 0.113 Yes Yes Yes 
2 UK272 0.039 0.063 0.054 0.050 Yes Yes Yes 
3 UK218 0.051 0.070 0.060 0.055 Yes Yes Yes 
4 UK373 0.022 0.053 0.046 0.042 Yes Yes Yes 
5 US64 0.081 0.128 0.111 0.101 Yes Yes Yes 
6 US50 0.077 0.144 0.125 0.114 Yes Yes Yes 
7 HK199 0.032 0.073 0.063 0.058 Yes Yes Yes 
8 HK261 0.060 0.064 0.055 0.051 Yes No No 
9 AU152 0.070 0.084 0.072 0.066 Yes Yes No 
10 AU161 0.050 0.081 0.070 0.064 Yes Yes Yes 
11 SP45 0.060 0.152 0.131 0.120 Yes Yes Yes 
12 SP114 0.094 0.096 0.083 0.076 Yes No No 
 
ID Database Pareto 
alias D Dα=0.01 Dα=0.05 Dα=0.10 D<Dα=0.01? D<Dα=0.05? D<Dα=0.10? 
1 UK51 0.088 0.224 0.187 0.168 Yes Yes Yes 
2 UK272 0.261 0.098 0.082 0.074 No No No 
3 UK218 0.101 0.109 0.091 0.082 Yes No No 
4 UK373 0.129 0.084 0.070 0.063 No No No 
5 US64 0.074 0.200 0.167 0.150 Yes Yes Yes 
6 US50 0.140 0.226 0.188 0.170 Yes Yes Yes 
7 HK199 0.200 0.114 0.095 0.086 No No No 
8 HK261 0.080 0.100 0.083 0.075 Yes Yes No 
9 AU152 0.118 0.131 0.109 0.098 Yes No No 
10 AU161 0.122 0.127 0.106 0.095 Yes No No 
11 SP45 0.133 0.238 0.198 0.179 Yes Yes Yes 
12 SP114 0.158 0.151 0.126 0.113 No No No 
Table 4. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for checking the LogNormal and Pareto distributions fitting to 
the distribution of Contract size opportunities 
ID 
Database Tenders Critical χ² α  values Poisson Normal LogNormal Logistic LogLogistic Laplace 
alias (ordered) χ²α=0.01 χ²α=0.05 χ²α=0.10 χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value 
1 UK51 1-26 15,086 11,070 9,236 35,570 0 1,000 10,574 2 0,939 13,568 1 0,981 8,255 3 0,857 10,796 2 0,944 5,340 3 0,624 
  27-52 15,086 11,070 9,236 6,604 3 0,748 1,424 3 0,078 3,133 3 0,321 1,748 3 0,117 3,254 3 0,339 2,654 3 0,247 
2 UK272 1-30 16,812 12,592 10,645 8,889 3 0,820 2,288 3 0,109 5,736 3 0,547 2,589 3 0,142 5,742 3 0,547 5,058 3 0,464 
  31-60 16,812 12,592 10,645 5,459 3 0,514 3,014 3 0,193 5,083 3 0,467 3,569 3 0,265 4,838 3 0,435 5,522 3 0,521 
  61-90 18,475 14,067 12,017 6,387 3 0,505 5,983 3 0,458 8,210 3 0,686 5,598 3 0,413 7,224 3 0,594 5,566 3 0,409 
  91-120 16,812 12,592 10,645 10,882 2 0,908 3,338 3 0,235 1,396 3 0,034 1,952 3 0,076 0,676 3 0,005 2,178 3 0,097 
  121-150 16,812 12,592 10,645 14,941 1 0,979 4,048 3 0,330 10,436 3 0,893 4,369 3 0,373 9,114 3 0,833 5,526 3 0,522 
  151-180 16,812 12,592 10,645 12,481 2 0,948 2,775 3 0,164 4,751 3 0,424 3,635 3 0,274 5,087 3 0,467 5,501 3 0,519 
  181-210 16,812 12,592 10,645 7,230 3 0,700 3,072 3 0,200 0,602 3 0,004 2,536 3 0,136 0,635 3 0,004 2,843 3 0,172 
  211-240 20,090 15,507 13,362 9,531 3 0,701 4,203 3 0,162 4,223 3 0,164 3,347 3 0,089 3,103 3 0,072 2,548 3 0,041 
  241-272 18,475 14,067 12,017 13,175 2 0,932 2,539 3 0,076 6,910 3 0,562 1,196 3 0,009 3,048 3 0,119 1,384 3 0,014 
3 UK218 1-31 15,086 11,070 9,236 2,425 3 0,212 1,987 3 0,149 4,188 3 0,477 2,698 3 0,254 5,348 3 0,625 3,775 3 0,418 
  32-62 16,812 12,592 10,645 5,308 3 0,495 5,591 3 0,529 8,923 3 0,822 7,131 3 0,691 10,742 2 0,903 9,309 3 0,843 
  63-93 18,475 14,067 12,017 11,516 3 0,882 8,452 3 0,706 21,285 0 0,997 9,089 3 0,754 18,826 0 0,991 147,947 0 1,000 
  94-124 18,475 14,067 12,017 9,124 3 0,756 5,459 3 0,396 12,083 2 0,902 6,138 3 0,476 11,497 3 0,882 8,748 3 0,729 
  125-155 18,475 14,067 12,017 1,084 3 0,007 0,861 3 0,003 4,041 3 0,225 1,264 3 0,011 4,092 3 0,231 2,749 3 0,093 
  156-186 20,090 15,507 13,362 14,757 2 0,936 14,231 2 0,924 16,403 1 0,963 11,792 3 0,839 12,530 3 0,871 10,406 3 0,762 
  187-218 16,812 12,592 10,645 15,144 1 0,981 4,640 3 0,409 4,129 3 0,341 4,260 3 0,358 3,792 3 0,295 7,862 3 0,752 
4 UK373 1-37 11,345 7,815 6,251 3,434 3 0,671 5,057 3 0,832 2,094 3 0,447 5,283 3 0,848 2,441 3 0,514 11,192 1 0,989 
  38-74 16,812 12,592 10,645 7,211 3 0,698 6,560 3 0,637 6,065 3 0,584 7,038 3 0,683 7,863 3 0,752 9,134 3 0,834 
  75-111 16,812 12,592 10,645 1,222 3 0,024 2,468 3 0,128 3,362 3 0,238 4,344 3 0,370 5,224 3 0,485 5,501 3 0,519 
  112-148 15,086 11,070 9,236 9,388 2 0,905 3,996 3 0,450 8,642 3 0,876 5,754 3 0,669 10,010 2 0,925 13,000 1 0,977 
  149-185 18,475 14,067 12,017 14,135 1 0,951 10,871 3 0,856 17,327 1 0,985 11,424 3 0,879 16,679 1 0,980 14,661 1 0,959 
  186-222 18,475 14,067 12,017 9,091 3 0,754 4,476 3 0,276 6,923 3 0,563 3,599 3 0,175 6,959 3 0,567 5,488 3 0,399 
  223-259 18,475 14,067 12,017 9,498 3 0,781 3,346 3 0,149 4,847 3 0,321 5,014 3 0,342 6,419 3 0,508 10,900 3 0,857 
  260-296 20,090 15,507 13,362 5,558 3 0,303 0,981 3 0,002 5,424 3 0,289 1,203 3 0,003 3,799 3 0,125 2,364 3 0,032 
  297-333 13,277 9,488 7,779 7,576 3 0,892 2,117 3 0,286 1,841 3 0,235 3,390 3 0,505 2,923 3 0,429 3,678 3 0,549 
  334-373 18,475 14,067 12,017 27,508 0 1,000 9,224 3 0,763 23,669 0 0,999 6,021 3 0,463 13,393 2 0,937 3,667 3 0,183 
5 US64 1-32 21,666 16,919 14,684 21,312 1 0,989 19,878 1 0,981 7,653 3 0,431 16,177 2 0,937 6,069 3 0,267 8,722 3 0,537 
  33-64 21,666 16,919 14,684 3,152 3 0,042 4,387 3 0,116 2,941 3 0,033 5,830 3 0,243 4,108 3 0,096 7,130 3 0,376 
6 US50 1-25 16,812 12,592 10,645 6,086 3 0,586 4,626 3 0,407 7,333 3 0,709 5,220 3 0,484 6,946 3 0,674 76,542 0 1,000 
  26-50 18,475 14,067 12,017 2,461 3 0,070 4,329 3 0,259 0,922 3 0,004 4,373 3 0,264 1,347 3 0,013 5,565 3 0,409 
7 HK199 1-50 36,191 30,144 27,204 256,220 0 1,000 25,883 3 0,867 13,216 3 0,173 24,880 3 0,835 15,286 3 0,296 21,734 3 0,702 
  51-100 37,566 31,410 28,412 215,765 0 1,000 22,422 3 0,682 30,835 2 0,943 25,890 3 0,831 31,177 2 0,947 29,231 2 0,917 
  101-150 38,932 32,671 29,615 1199,26 0 1,000 26,811 3 0,823 24,983 3 0,752 31,599 2 0,936 29,246 3 0,892 34,201 1 0,966 
  151-199 33,409 27,587 24,769 100,758 0 1,000 8,172 3 0,037 33,241 1 0,989 8,798 3 0,054 23,265 3 0,859 11,412 3 0,166 
8 HK261 1-52 40,289 33,924 30,813 301,940 0 1,000 24,471 3 0,677 14,049 3 0,100 24,975 3 0,702 14,481 3 0,116 21,837 3 0,530 
  53-104 41,638 35,172 32,007 2194,39 0 1,000 28,378 3 0,798 18,279 3 0,258 30,335 3 0,860 22,008 3 0,480 29,564 3 0,838 
  105-156 41,638 35,172 32,007 570,175 0 1,000 22,387 3 0,503 22,657 3 0,519 27,875 3 0,779 28,159 3 0,790 33,969 2 0,934 
  157-208 37,566 31,410 28,412 748,019 0 1,000 32,433 1 0,961 30,783 2 0,942 46,466 0 0,999 38,508 0 0,992 54,722 0 1,000 
  209-261 37,566 31,410 28,412 760,478 0 1,000 23,974 3 0,756 11,650 3 0,072 27,681 3 0,883 16,349 3 0,305 24,085 3 0,761 
9 AU152 1-50 29,141 23,685 21,064 96,359 0 1,000 28,584 1 0,988 19,174 3 0,842 35,346 0 0,999 24,562 1 0,961 38,008 0 0,999 
  51-101 30,578 24,996 22,307 102,139 0 1,000 21,111 3 0,867 20,794 3 0,856 19,976 3 0,827 21,327 3 0,873 18,957 3 0,784 
  102-152 27,688 22,362 19,812 5,757 3 0,045 3,902 3 0,008 15,191 3 0,704 4,748 3 0,020 11,930 3 0,467 7,866 3 0,148 
10 AU161 1-40 23,209 18,307 15,987 71,356 0 1,000 17,711 2 0,940 3,932 3 0,050 13,516 3 0,804 3,714 3 0,041 9,730 3 0,536 
  41-80 21,666 16,919 14,684 8,191 3 0,485 12,178 3 0,797 4,320 3 0,111 10,268 3 0,671 3,242 3 0,046 7,681 3 0,433 
  81-120 21,666 16,919 14,684 5,776 3 0,238 6,338 3 0,294 2,805 3 0,028 5,474 3 0,209 2,775 3 0,027 6,531 3 0,314 
  121-161 23,209 18,307 15,987 3,944 3 0,050 5,238 3 0,125 5,229 3 0,125 4,902 3 0,102 5,123 3 0,117 6,056 3 0,189 
11 SP45 1-22 26,217 21,026 18,549 149,734 0 1,000 11,948 3 0,550 8,516 3 0,256 13,760 3 0,684 10,767 3 0,451 13,739 3 0,682 
  23-45 30,578 24,996 22,307 310608 0 1,000 22,240 3 0,898 13,279 3 0,419 23,883 2 0,933 15,942 3 0,614 21,298 3 0,872 
12 SP114 1-38 38,932 32,671 29,615 2185,9 0 1,000 24,420 3 0,727 26,318 3 0,805 27,857 3 0,856 30,110 2 0,910 36,576 1 0,981 
  39-76 32,000 26,296 23,542 83,776 0 1,000 18,223 3 0,689 34,504 0 0,995 17,268 3 0,632 31,804 1 0,989 17,910 3 0,671 
  77-114 33,409 27,587 24,769 39,029 0 0,998 23,895 3 0,878 15,926 3 0,471 27,568 2 0,950 20,069 3 0,729 27,077 2 0,943 
      avg. 1,679 0,745 avg. 2,830 0,492 avg. 2,623 0,508 avg. 2,811 0,520 avg. 2.660 0,535 avg. 2,528 0,589 




LogNormal (Number of 
interested bidders) Critical χ² α  values Model distribution 
alias μ1 (log) σ1 (log) μ2 (log) σ2 (log) Nmax χ²α=0.01 χ²α=0.05 χ²α=0.10 χ² χ²<χ²α? p-value 
1 UK51 13.937 0.852 17.143 3.305 10 18.475 14.067 12.017 3.803 3 0.198 
2 UK272 12.122 0.932 14.731 2.925 9 21.666 16.919 14.684 8.768 3 0.541 
3 UK218 10.788 1.357 13.910 3.023 9 21.666 16.919 14.684 10.056 3 0.654 
4 UK373 12.457 1.032 15.287 2.565 9 21.666 16.919 14.684 11.819 3 0.776 
5 US64 13.336 1.393 17.543 3.452 13 23.209 18.307 15.987 6.808 3 0.257 
6 US50 14.125 0.488 15.507 1.167 9 18.475 14.067 12.017 1.403 3 0.015 
7 HK199 16.157 1.158 20.490 2.986 35 48.278 41.337 37.916 27.320 3 0.499 
8 HK261 18.130 1.023 15.085 2.143 33 49.588 42.557 39.087 31.237 3 0.646 
9 AU152 13.813 1.251 18.115 3.078 21 30.578 24.996 22.307 13.386 3 0.428 
10 AU161 11.701 1.128 15.219 3.078 11 27.688 22.362 19.812 8.098 3 0.163 
11 SP45 14.297 1.274 18.592 2.674 40 34.805 28.869 25.989 12.213 3 0.164 
12 SP114 17.054 1.185 20.097 2.991 51 57.342 49.802 46.059 42.942 3 0.832 
          
avg. 3.000 0.431 
Table 6. Chi-square tests for checking the model distribution fitting to the Number of Bidders 
Rank Distribution 
Average values Std. Deviation values 
χ²<χ²α? p-value χ²<χ²α? p-value 
1 New model proposed (with two-LogNormals) 3.000 0.431 0.000 0.269 
2 Normal (discriminating by contract size) 2.830 0.492 0.509 0.327 
3 LogNormal (discriminating by contract size) 2.623 0.508 0.860 0.335 
3 Logistic (discriminating by contract size) 2.811 0.520 0.622 0.328 
3 Loglogistic (discriminating by contract size) 2.660 0.535 0.758 0.336 
6 Laplace (discriminating by contract size) 2.528 0.589 0.953 0.311 
7 LogNormal (without discriminating by contract size) 1.750 0.647 1.357 0.420 
8 LogLogistic (without discriminating by contract size) 1.500 0.658 1.567 0.426 
8 Poisson (discriminating by contract size) 1.679 0.745 1.384 0.330 
10 Logistic (without discriminating by contract size) 1.583 0.831 1.379 0.232 
11 Normal (without discriminating by contract size) 1.583 0.836 1.240 0.234 
12 Laplace (without discriminating by contract size) 0.917 0.898 1.311 0.178 
13 Poisson (without discriminating by contract size) 0.667 0.903 1.231 0.274 
Table 7. Ranking of distributions analysed for modelling the Number of bidders as a function of the 
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Figure 1. Poisson, Normal, LogNormal, Logistic, LogLogistic and Laplace distribution fitting 























































































































































































Figure 2. Variation of the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the Number of 
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Contract size interval where it is 
reasonable to assume that N 
follows a Normal distribution 
* Despite being represented as continuous distributions, these curves are actually discrete 
Domain of most tender databases contract sizes 
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Figure 5. Calculation of the Number of participating bidders distribution as a function of the 
Contract size opportunities and Number of interested bidders distributions 
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Figure 6. Possible Number of bidders distributions as a function of the relative magnitudes of the Contract size 
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Figure 7. Model distribution fitting to the Number of bidders considering the complete dataset 
for the twelve datasets 
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Order ID Bm N 
Dataset 1 
1 49 255,475 5 
2 17 312,916 10 
3 50 397,252 5 
4 5 406,027 6 
5 18 470,578 6 
6 26 499,016 7 
7 2 520,943 4 
8 38 547,634 5 
9 32 565,353 6 
10 29 580,262 6 
11 22 602,953 6 
12 51 604,565 6 
13 14 638,915 6 
14 13 655,085 4 
15 31 666,511 6 
16 4 679,706 6 
17 43 714,806 6 
18 39 749,287 7 
19 48 764,006 7 
20 36 784,334 6 
21 33 829,005 6 
22 16 865,610 3 
23 35 865,760 6 
24 9 922,574 6 
25 10 1,099,822 4 
26 12 1,230,384 6 
27 24 1,244,998 8 
28 45 1,264,500 4 
29 3 1,388,291 7 
30 1 1,469,900 6 
31 47 1,485,788 8 
32 15 1,533,303 6 
33 41 1,587,053 6 
34 23 1,648,883 5 
35 27 1,658,920 4 
36 11 1,840,047 6 
37 6 2,175,920 9 
38 34 2,193,878 7 
39 40 2,224,161 8 
40 28 2,228,506 7 
41 44 2,299,880 5 
42 25 2,709,641 6 
43 30 2,787,458 6 
44 46 2,858,348 7 
45 19 3,098,473 9 
46 7 3,190,937 7 
47 42 3,811,024 8 
48 21 4,026,060 7 
49 37 7,092,871 9 
50 8 7,387,959 4 
51 20 8,070,280 8 
Dataset 2 
1 65 5,752 2 
2 132 16,055 6 
3 36 18,745 2 
4 175 20,872 8 
5 1 21,043 3 
6 271 22,602 4 
7 221 22,847 6 
8 154 23,606 4 
9 148 24,296 4 
10 6 26,599 6 
11 176 26,985 6 
12 38 27,498 5 
13 227 29,002 5 
14 222 29,309 3 
15 155 29,800 4 
Order ID Bm N 
    
16 153 30,060 5 
17 42 30,846 6 
18 105 32,330 7 
19 39 38,903 5 
20 7 40,225 5 
21 162 40,962 6 
22 149 41,843 5 
23 256 42,201 3 
24 129 43,721 4 
25 160 44,195 5 
26 220 44,690 6 
27 163 44,973 5 
28 239 45,573 3 
29 76 46,808 5 
30 156 46,828 3 
31 146 48,194 8 
32 8 50,173 4 
33 9 50,871 5 
34 58 51,998 7 
35 224 52,655 7 
36 232 54,562 4 
37 225 55,555 5 
38 63 63,381 6 
39 130 64,193 8 
40 157 64,430 2 
41 80 65,612 5 
42 61 66,534 7 
43 131 67,182 4 
44 88 68,601 8 
45 62 69,502 3 
46 203 71,184 7 
47 90 72,605 2 
48 50 72,648 4 
49 195 76,842 4 
50 204 77,745 6 
51 255 77,748 4 
52 201 78,599 6 
53 89 82,153 4 
54 86 83,042 6 
55 137 83,206 4 
56 116 84,398 3 
57 67 84,717 6 
58 60 85,427 6 
59 104 86,547 5 
60 181 86,857 6 
61 258 87,192 3 
62 119 88,932 6 
63 98 89,109 6 
64 109 91,469 6 
65 106 93,184 5 
66 95 93,683 6 
67 41 95,009 6 
68 268 99,293 3 
69 68 99,585 6 
70 40 100,055 7 
71 133 101,205 7 
72 147 101,678 5 
73 269 101,960 8 
74 193 103,719 8 
75 71 109,643 2 
76 72 112,067 8 
77 100 112,958 8 
78 174 114,272 8 
79 16 114,342 11 
80 218 115,621 5 
81 244 119,564 6 
82 118 119,621 4 
Order ID Bm N 
    
83 192 119,960 6 
84 191 122,423 5 
85 94 123,751 7 
86 172 123,752 8 
87 110 129,204 8 
88 260 129,318 3 
89 115 129,918 6 
90 14 130,043 7 
91 34 134,108 7 
92 56 134,131 6 
93 185 135,792 5 
94 252 136,210 6 
95 121 139,907 5 
96 145 140,355 8 
97 186 141,088 7 
98 19 141,172 6 
99 77 143,545 5 
100 197 145,920 10 
101 182 146,810 4 
102 241 147,346 8 
103 96 147,706 6 
104 17 148,493 7 
105 161 149,968 3 
106 254 150,922 7 
107 10 150,978 6 
108 97 151,169 5 
109 259 151,653 8 
110 245 153,161 8 
111 230 154,097 5 
112 173 154,405 7 
113 212 154,486 5 
114 81 154,944 5 
115 74 155,037 6 
116 138 156,122 6 
117 179 156,794 6 
118 111 157,101 6 
119 33 157,391 5 
120 59 163,843 4 
121 159 164,295 5 
122 234 165,137 7 
123 253 165,936 6 
124 262 166,609 7 
125 200 168,631 4 
126 23 170,477 6 
127 126 174,111 7 
128 242 175,115 8 
129 152 175,328 8 
130 226 176,334 6 
131 114 176,778 8 
132 70 178,821 4 
133 85 180,630 8 
134 135 183,550 6 
135 11 183,924 7 
136 187 184,729 8 
137 27 185,639 8 
138 171 186,284 8 
139 28 187,459 6 
140 167 189,190 8 
141 12 192,949 7 
142 183 193,093 7 
143 113 194,181 6 
144 238 194,557 7 
145 178 195,704 3 
146 122 197,390 9 
147 206 198,031 9 
148 250 199,406 5 
149 43 199,638 5 
Order ID Bm N 
    
150 188 200,765 8 
151 103 202,149 6 
152 112 202,168 4 
153 202 204,300 6 
154 168 204,482 8 
155 123 206,321 6 
156 180 206,432 9 
157 170 207,578 8 
158 205 211,129 6 
159 210 214,249 6 
160 29 217,260 6 
161 66 217,446 7 
162 189 218,332 8 
163 208 219,037 4 
164 263 222,316 7 
165 158 224,650 7 
166 78 225,170 6 
167 151 230,210 5 
168 266 230,476 7 
169 233 230,554 7 
170 215 232,022 5 
171 30 236,352 4 
172 184 237,491 4 
173 108 238,521 6 
174 31 240,525 5 
175 54 243,298 3 
176 22 243,855 6 
177 199 244,124 8 
178 169 245,394 6 
179 92 246,461 5 
180 165 247,102 8 
181 207 251,498 6 
182 57 253,158 8 
183 24 254,885 8 
184 13 257,123 9 
185 217 259,894 6 
186 117 260,829 4 
187 3 262,157 5 
188 164 266,082 5 
189 190 276,485 6 
190 107 276,824 9 
191 128 278,246 5 
192 150 278,880 4 
193 93 279,423 6 
194 4 280,954 8 
195 177 282,886 5 
196 99 286,431 5 
197 124 288,278 7 
198 166 293,985 7 
199 257 298,370 7 
200 46 314,221 5 
201 246 316,789 7 
202 84 332,029 6 
203 87 334,262 7 
204 194 335,961 7 
205 265 336,091 10 
206 249 336,868 8 
207 102 352,430 6 
208 15 356,801 14 
209 219 357,349 8 
210 83 366,464 6 
211 140 371,239 7 
212 26 376,399 6 
213 53 377,927 6 
214 101 378,556 6 
215 5 401,972 6 
216 261 405,297 8 
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Order ID Bm N 
    
217 247 406,191 7 
218 267 406,191 7 
219 51 408,980 10 
220 198 409,354 4 
221 64 415,820 7 
222 55 425,958 6 
223 120 431,343 8 
224 91 439,911 5 
225 127 444,029 5 
226 141 455,627 8 
227 270 465,382 3 
228 44 478,889 7 
229 248 486,656 9 
230 18 487,318 11 
231 251 491,287 5 
232 209 494,573 7 
233 240 503,235 6 
234 25 506,462 10 
235 243 511,560 6 
236 223 515,963 6 
237 134 529,380 6 
238 82 538,110 4 
239 211 541,719 7 
240 2 542,347 8 
241 45 560,949 8 
242 144 564,537 8 
243 69 662,731 7 
244 196 664,835 9 
245 20 740,024 7 
246 21 749,178 7 
247 228 760,179 7 
248 143 768,544 3 
249 216 775,630 6 
250 52 776,894 6 
251 139 789,119 7 
252 214 845,629 7 
253 125 871,134 7 
254 229 907,487 6 
255 48 987,521 9 
256 235 987,774 5 
257 272 1,004,402 6 
258 32 1,006,498 8 
259 136 1,030,093 6 
260 236 1,057,545 8 
261 49 1,059,427 7 
262 47 1,238,914 6 
263 35 1,767,575 7 
264 213 1,780,238 6 
265 79 2,279,604 7 
266 237 2,683,822 10 
267 264 2,683,828 10 
268 231 2,776,352 8 
269 142 2,815,698 6 
270 73 8,234,520 5 
271 75 8,489,562 5 
272 37 9,296,868 4 
Dataset 3 
1 189 1,211 2 
2 5 2,413 5 
3 72 2,654 5 
4 31 3,112 2 
5 18 3,222 3 
6 127 4,036 3 
7 136 4,464 6 
8 27 4,685 2 
9 192 5,217 5 
10 201 5,366 2 
Order ID Bm N 
    
11 61 5,796 5 
12 92 5,861 3 
13 8 6,629 8 
14 64 6,919 2 
15 182 6,927 6 
16 195 7,202 6 
17 145 8,110 4 
18 83 8,282 5 
19 7 8,298 3 
20 114 8,517 4 
21 63 9,159 2 
22 90 9,326 4 
23 154 9,635 5 
24 91 9,670 4 
25 167 9,787 4 
26 190 9,807 4 
27 73 11,545 3 
28 69 11,676 6 
29 153 11,803 6 
30 218 11,889 5 
31 177 11,890 5 
32 159 12,807 4 
33 213 13,666 3 
34 168 14,264 6 
35 104 14,287 4 
36 70 14,314 5 
37 116 14,425 2 
38 1 15,046 8 
39 129 16,996 4 
40 60 17,763 5 
41 4 17,767 3 
42 173 18,010 3 
43 14 18,551 6 
44 199 18,817 5 
45 67 18,973 4 
46 55 19,801 2 
47 68 20,069 4 
48 21 20,116 2 
49 118 20,423 3 
50 216 20,469 8 
51 142 20,545 6 
52 37 20,802 2 
53 85 20,925 6 
54 25 21,219 2 
55 19 21,305 2 
56 84 21,416 4 
57 107 21,787 2 
58 175 21,993 6 
59 160 22,073 7 
60 132 22,210 6 
61 186 22,551 6 
62 126 22,889 4 
63 123 23,524 6 
64 86 23,829 7 
65 124 23,832 6 
66 174 23,858 6 
67 121 23,986 6 
68 176 24,023 6 
69 171 24,310 7 
70 22 24,438 2 
71 120 24,447 6 
72 200 24,624 8 
73 170 24,912 8 
74 209 24,946 7 
75 80 25,279 5 
76 23 25,288 2 
77 26 25,523 2 
Order ID Bm N 
    
78 122 25,623 6 
79 198 26,406 8 
80 58 26,541 3 
81 87 26,960 5 
82 193 27,311 9 
83 20 27,732 2 
84 185 27,757 8 
85 82 29,038 4 
86 49 29,575 5 
87 111 29,713 5 
88 156 29,808 5 
89 206 29,852 7 
90 78 31,271 5 
91 24 32,420 2 
92 117 32,952 4 
93 208 32,962 6 
94 215 33,354 7 
95 59 33,385 3 
96 191 33,509 7 
97 113 33,641 3 
98 62 34,764 6 
99 13 35,358 6 
100 71 35,818 6 
101 178 36,433 5 
102 205 38,145 9 
103 135 40,184 6 
104 217 40,452 8 
105 2 40,862 8 
106 34 41,282 6 
107 112 42,041 4 
108 211 44,620 7 
109 36 44,724 8 
110 28 45,707 4 
111 214 47,248 6 
112 44 47,534 7 
113 130 48,582 4 
114 11 48,682 7 
115 115 49,769 5 
116 54 50,375 2 
117 134 50,520 6 
118 179 50,695 4 
119 128 50,856 2 
120 74 51,410 4 
121 133 51,549 6 
122 184 52,254 8 
123 131 53,644 6 
124 148 54,101 4 
125 99 55,239 4 
126 32 58,195 5 
127 163 60,332 5 
128 66 65,616 7 
129 147 67,072 4 
130 197 67,652 7 
131 53 69,894 2 
132 98 74,280 5 
133 45 74,587 2 
134 76 76,183 3 
135 188 77,321 9 
136 79 78,715 5 
137 89 79,745 3 
138 95 81,210 7 
139 149 81,450 6 
140 77 84,110 3 
141 146 86,481 7 
142 12 89,978 13 
143 75 91,422 4 
144 202 92,063 9 
Order ID Bm N 
    
145 6 92,596 10 
146 143 93,938 6 
147 203 94,027 7 
148 183 97,760 5 
149 140 99,405 7 
150 88 100,567 6 
151 93 102,126 6 
152 150 104,115 6 
153 33 107,038 7 
154 48 111,189 6 
155 196 112,007 9 
156 57 113,796 7 
157 137 115,081 6 
158 141 115,471 6 
159 97 119,885 7 
160 50 121,158 3 
161 139 122,544 8 
162 164 122,895 8 
163 94 129,329 6 
164 180 130,153 6 
165 41 130,359 5 
166 17 134,443 14 
167 9 146,246 7 
168 101 148,013 2 
169 187 152,111 9 
170 81 155,835 5 
171 125 157,494 4 
172 169 170,593 7 
173 15 174,266 7 
174 39 175,981 7 
175 155 186,359 7 
176 157 195,637 7 
177 194 198,405 11 
178 165 199,653 7 
179 119 204,132 5 
180 52 213,544 7 
181 40 226,280 4 
182 152 227,459 5 
183 10 242,757 11 
184 100 255,876 5 
185 51 257,050 5 
186 47 259,844 7 
187 43 261,374 6 
188 103 264,877 6 
189 212 268,807 4 
190 106 272,708 7 
191 42 284,132 5 
192 110 287,760 7 
193 35 289,899 6 
194 109 336,040 6 
195 105 370,847 8 
196 144 410,514 7 
197 151 426,977 9 
198 172 428,115 10 
199 138 431,616 7 
200 108 445,232 6 
201 3 509,741 9 
202 102 530,878 8 
203 166 537,637 6 
204 56 547,061 6 
205 181 562,081 8 
206 46 580,737 7 
207 38 607,239 6 
208 29 720,865 8 
209 158 779,079 9 
210 210 851,480 9 
211 204 885,689 9 
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212 65 1,025,652 8 
213 161 1,154,586 7 
214 96 1,156,500 7 
215 30 1,169,669 14 
216 207 1,383,514 9 
217 162 1,996,684 8 
218 16 2,443,593 8 
Dataset 4 
1 270 10,266 2 
2 201 18,756 2 
3 162 20,607 2 
4 192 22,609 2 
5 10 25,800 2 
6 189 32,296 4 
7 71 35,050 2 
8 131 39,459 4 
9 3 42,309 3 
10 76 42,335 2 
11 59 46,230 2 
12 218 46,965 3 
13 93 47,257 2 
14 127 48,179 3 
15 173 48,643 2 
16 57 49,786 3 
17 166 49,788 2 
18 4 50,011 3 
19 31 50,709 3 
20 135 51,024 3 
21 98 51,737 3 
22 302 51,762 3 
23 46 52,509 4 
24 369 52,517 5 
25 227 57,866 2 
26 88 59,237 2 
27 114 59,666 4 
28 42 60,154 3 
29 170 61,560 2 
30 86 62,747 2 
31 183 64,407 5 
32 168 64,768 3 
33 8 64,870 2 
34 154 65,584 2 
35 259 67,107 5 
36 306 69,055 3 
37 289 70,535 2 
38 25 72,051 3 
39 269 73,042 6 
40 191 75,073 3 
41 23 75,675 2 
42 303 77,774 4 
43 172 78,675 4 
44 279 81,868 3 
45 6 83,477 3 
46 96 83,722 2 
47 185 84,382 2 
48 169 84,652 2 
49 274 86,141 3 
50 116 86,209 4 
51 101 88,478 5 
52 196 89,054 4 
53 359 89,544 6 
54 213 90,931 3 
55 142 92,008 3 
56 159 92,742 4 
57 1 93,246 7 
58 181 97,951 4 
59 15 98,687 2 
Order ID Bm N 
    
60 115 99,086 6 
61 230 99,339 6 
62 297 99,470 6 
63 187 100,309 4 
64 262 101,130 8 
65 37 104,858 4 
66 97 105,919 3 
67 313 106,138 2 
68 48 106,193 5 
69 371 106,300 3 
70 81 107,887 6 
71 206 110,050 2 
72 197 110,194 4 
73 291 110,884 4 
74 246 111,308 3 
75 62 112,400 2 
76 199 112,882 3 
77 271 113,112 6 
78 278 114,144 3 
79 301 114,593 4 
80 163 114,748 2 
81 345 116,618 2 
82 33 116,931 5 
83 91 117,739 7 
84 14 118,503 2 
85 171 119,032 4 
86 272 119,270 6 
87 26 119,631 6 
88 83 123,004 4 
89 219 123,418 6 
90 348 124,383 8 
91 47 124,537 3 
92 182 125,622 3 
93 298 125,771 4 
94 326 126,402 5 
95 212 126,660 5 
96 107 126,800 4 
97 79 129,460 5 
98 84 130,632 5 
99 287 131,416 5 
100 74 131,565 8 
101 312 133,233 3 
102 128 133,540 7 
103 24 133,971 3 
104 38 134,815 7 
105 317 135,358 8 
106 125 135,369 2 
107 307 135,660 2 
108 87 144,477 5 
109 157 146,759 2 
110 343 148,003 7 
111 341 148,421 3 
112 69 150,081 5 
113 70 151,904 5 
114 193 152,157 5 
115 52 152,238 5 
116 237 153,443 4 
117 174 153,789 7 
118 165 158,196 3 
119 7 158,521 3 
120 328 158,794 4 
121 368 159,037 4 
122 19 159,861 6 
123 362 160,155 5 
124 276 160,607 5 
125 325 161,488 6 
126 113 163,868 5 
Order ID Bm N 
    
127 344 165,774 5 
128 207 166,162 6 
129 300 168,570 4 
130 286 168,656 3 
131 92 168,704 4 
132 244 171,307 2 
133 356 172,202 6 
134 21 174,101 2 
135 232 175,982 5 
136 99 177,015 2 
137 51 177,396 3 
138 373 177,447 6 
139 258 178,802 3 
140 332 182,529 2 
141 148 183,077 5 
142 158 183,573 3 
143 215 183,956 3 
144 145 185,581 6 
145 216 185,766 6 
146 315 185,777 3 
147 152 186,199 7 
148 239 188,155 6 
149 273 189,592 5 
150 68 190,001 8 
151 151 192,221 3 
152 220 193,145 5 
153 252 195,882 6 
154 12 198,895 4 
155 119 199,253 7 
156 223 199,539 6 
157 322 201,565 6 
158 240 203,383 6 
159 164 203,517 6 
160 43 204,325 10 
161 285 205,432 7 
162 140 207,530 7 
163 150 209,994 6 
164 108 213,588 5 
165 146 217,099 7 
166 204 219,550 6 
167 295 220,081 6 
168 20 221,482 6 
169 153 221,736 2 
170 241 222,186 6 
171 208 222,858 10 
172 352 225,887 8 
173 40 226,345 3 
174 222 228,306 3 
175 324 228,548 6 
176 28 228,611 2 
177 89 228,686 7 
178 54 229,444 4 
179 370 231,175 6 
180 34 234,544 8 
181 251 235,048 7 
182 226 240,781 3 
183 292 240,785 3 
184 314 242,726 7 
185 264 245,385 3 
186 342 247,403 4 
187 117 249,180 6 
188 355 249,957 4 
189 235 250,595 6 
190 45 250,649 3 
191 147 251,652 6 
192 335 252,577 6 
193 319 253,958 7 
Order ID Bm N 
    
194 134 257,506 3 
195 149 259,653 5 
196 347 260,232 6 
197 138 261,590 7 
198 39 263,795 4 
199 364 268,421 4 
200 120 273,857 6 
201 281 275,082 10 
202 200 275,553 3 
203 339 277,997 7 
204 305 292,008 7 
205 194 292,696 7 
206 121 293,169 5 
207 363 293,720 6 
208 75 295,163 6 
209 311 295,839 9 
210 105 296,576 5 
211 327 301,196 6 
212 85 306,749 6 
213 102 307,320 8 
214 11 308,365 6 
215 309 308,864 5 
216 104 315,881 3 
217 329 316,722 4 
218 367 320,945 7 
219 211 325,739 3 
220 234 326,936 5 
221 132 329,463 5 
222 90 330,003 7 
223 354 331,138 6 
224 243 336,799 8 
225 265 339,929 8 
226 320 341,272 5 
227 144 346,369 11 
228 266 346,650 8 
229 95 350,441 8 
230 53 351,739 3 
231 190 354,912 4 
232 340 357,137 9 
233 109 357,794 8 
234 167 358,237 6 
235 156 362,705 5 
236 56 364,978 7 
237 228 367,800 9 
238 231 368,037 7 
239 349 385,951 6 
240 233 390,881 8 
241 129 391,214 5 
242 372 393,297 7 
243 293 393,967 5 
244 253 398,477 6 
245 257 398,555 4 
246 139 398,680 5 
247 112 400,523 7 
248 136 401,065 5 
249 296 401,373 6 
250 217 407,210 6 
251 82 411,514 6 
252 275 412,354 4 
253 290 415,477 7 
254 358 416,033 5 
255 133 416,141 4 
256 277 419,637 8 
257 66 421,229 7 
258 203 423,123 4 
259 122 425,352 8 
260 180 428,382 6 
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261 263 430,774 6 
262 9 443,592 8 
263 13 453,216 8 
264 316 457,125 5 
265 238 457,601 6 
266 73 462,459 4 
267 100 471,945 6 
268 304 474,179 9 
269 111 477,075 7 
270 63 495,134 6 
271 337 495,743 8 
272 357 502,889 3 
273 35 505,227 7 
274 32 509,133 5 
275 186 516,209 6 
276 260 516,448 4 
277 143 533,213 6 
278 310 533,285 5 
279 214 534,462 7 
280 72 542,917 9 
281 308 546,775 7 
282 209 547,133 6 
283 58 555,493 10 
284 282 558,570 5 
285 346 562,844 4 
286 360 567,769 7 
287 124 567,999 5 
288 247 578,837 2 
289 323 595,331 5 
290 64 602,094 3 
291 225 603,995 7 
292 44 605,672 9 
293 236 605,815 5 
294 250 609,716 6 
295 254 621,330 7 
296 141 621,751 4 
297 155 623,702 8 
298 67 625,582 8 
299 248 639,203 6 
300 224 647,075 4 
301 284 656,363 8 
302 294 660,556 6 
303 268 667,073 5 
304 365 673,507 7 
305 29 678,044 6 
306 210 684,172 5 
307 249 687,499 5 
308 55 695,530 6 
309 242 711,072 5 
310 178 718,094 7 
311 353 730,250 6 
312 221 731,243 7 
313 77 731,953 8 
314 118 733,926 6 
315 176 734,159 5 
316 333 736,153 4 
317 80 741,370 6 
318 351 760,367 7 
319 50 767,523 6 
320 49 779,007 8 
321 283 798,192 6 
322 110 799,855 4 
323 195 820,054 7 
324 330 841,216 5 
325 288 856,166 7 
326 366 863,234 8 
327 60 890,692 8 
Order ID Bm N 
    
328 256 904,120 6 
329 18 926,226 6 
330 299 927,109 4 
331 17 927,566 5 
332 334 929,771 4 
333 161 959,114 8 
334 103 964,725 6 
335 229 1,004,630 6 
336 5 1,026,480 7 
337 41 1,054,996 9 
338 188 1,120,178 6 
339 130 1,124,186 6 
340 30 1,166,292 7 
341 255 1,187,921 3 
342 338 1,191,547 7 
343 184 1,219,109 6 
344 94 1,231,401 5 
345 137 1,253,170 7 
346 202 1,320,747 6 
347 336 1,344,893 7 
348 261 1,360,551 4 
349 205 1,381,556 7 
350 2 1,472,162 6 
351 177 1,562,410 7 
352 22 1,568,224 7 
353 179 1,581,625 6 
354 321 1,583,369 6 
355 36 1,633,361 4 
356 106 1,659,637 5 
357 78 1,999,840 6 
358 350 2,005,694 6 
359 61 2,071,215 6 
360 198 2,189,824 5 
361 160 2,217,761 5 
362 267 2,446,742 3 
363 318 2,473,213 6 
364 65 2,662,722 6 
365 175 2,730,352 6 
366 27 2,824,961 9 
367 123 3,229,167 8 
368 126 3,387,660 2 
369 280 3,596,202 6 
370 245 3,985,016 6 
371 331 4,187,295 5 
372 16 4,726,542 5 
373 361 8,771,818 5 
Dataset 5 
1 9 29,044 7 
2 30 45,653 7 
3 13 77,294 7 
4 12 107,840 6 
5 39 137,589 20 
6 26 154,196 4 
7 53 162,505 13 
8 37 171,720 8 
9 8 176,835 3 
10 15 186,726 6 
11 36 188,702 6 
12 32 203,945 6 
13 16 204,247 8 
14 14 224,953 6 
15 57 228,182 8 
16 19 229,316 4 
17 7 230,766 6 
18 45 243,824 4 
19 35 263,014 8 
20 55 269,513 7 
Order ID Bm N 
    
21 64 285,590 13 
22 43 286,220 6 
23 49 287,666 5 
24 62 319,228 15 
25 29 382,367 10 
26 42 387,837 3 
27 52 393,076 5 
28 46 402,341 5 
29 51 424,831 6 
30 27 446,274 6 
31 63 478,377 6 
32 21 506,707 4 
33 61 520,026 4 
34 6 524,399 6 
35 50 598,986 11 
36 47 670,525 9 
37 10 747,552 2 
38 24 757,616 5 
39 11 868,992 4 
40 40 949,038 12 
41 34 1,316,515 6 
42 33 1,376,083 9 
43 25 1,481,536 7 
44 44 1,484,631 6 
45 48 1,515,446 8 
46 56 1,584,305 8 
47 38 1,601,454 4 
48 60 1,883,560 5 
49 5 2,003,500 7 
50 28 2,110,914 3 
51 17 2,303,748 4 
52 41 3,013,188 8 
53 18 3,197,054 4 
54 58 3,214,767 5 
55 3 3,492,159 6 
56 4 3,676,250 4 
57 1 4,150,514 7 
58 23 7,532,342 6 
59 31 7,865,411 7 
60 2 9,463,718 11 
61 54 12,201,531 8 
62 59 15,379,320 9 
63 20 17,429,631 5 
64 22 18,465,333 3 
Dataset 6 
1 16 20,247 3 
2 49 76,211 3 
3 31 98,962 5 
4 37 131,278 3 
5 28 145,951 5 
6 44 147,051 5 
7 26 147,200 5 
8 18 165,117 5 
9 23 174,157 2 
10 47 174,666 3 
11 3 174,981 5 
12 35 183,188 8 
13 9 233,860 7 
14 14 249,480 2 
15 36 255,602 4 
16 40 278,273 3 
17 30 305,750 4 
18 5 326,991 5 
19 45 399,197 6 
20 12 438,765 4 
21 50 448,149 5 
22 2 453,341 7 
Order ID Bm N 
    
7 20 522,621 7 
24 15 537,500 2 
25 6 598,250 4 
26 7 686,000 3 
27 38 767,358 3 
28 46 787,940 4 
29 29 804,355 3 
30 25 838,808 2 
31 4 861,231 7 
32 8 904,356 6 
33 11 965,780 6 
34 27 1,035,251 3 
35 19 1,197,103 5 
36 13 1,220,968 5 
37 24 1,315,074 7 
38 21 1,375,299 9 
39 41 1,409,432 4 
40 43 1,527,585 6 
41 17 1,635,392 5 
42 34 1,635,426 9 
43 10 1,725,065 6 
44 32 1,906,357 4 
45 22 2,205,996 4 
46 48 2,269,116 4 
47 39 2,277,616 2 
48 1 3,203,337 8 
49 42 3,869,281 3 
50 33 6,321,544 4 
Dataset 7 
7 43 763,896 17 
2 128 765,264 4 
3 77 800,696 9 
4 173 852,246 13 
5 32 872,496 18 
6 34 983,245 9 
7 74 1,099,338 14 
8 44 1,329,758 11 
9 140 1,345,589 9 
10 22 1,417,487 5 
11 36 1,455,436 7 
12 80 1,457,550 12 
13 1 1,521,264 5 
14 123 1,579,990 11 
15 16 1,639,043 7 
16 126 1,692,042 5 
17 176 1,695,106 5 
18 91 1,861,218 8 
19 40 1,932,775 12 
20 130 1,933,606 11 
21 79 1,945,299 16 
22 21 2,125,224 6 
23 76 2,197,257 10 
24 60 2,237,624 12 
25 65 2,315,028 9 
26 38 2,531,162 11 
27 124 2,604,669 9 
28 45 2,869,188 16 
29 134 2,923,644 6 
30 106 2,978,741 12 
31 117 3,077,471 10 
32 53 3,097,133 16 
33 72 3,103,435 7 
34 94 3,162,445 6 
35 109 3,374,166 18 
36 37 3,488,874 8 
37 158 3,793,233 21 
38 48 3,879,931 25 
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39 26 3,955,454 9 
40 42 4,074,833 7 
41 86 4,165,783 15 
42 64 4,263,397 11 
43 85 4,317,992 24 
44 19 4,411,610 5 
45 105 4,734,579 9 
46 104 4,895,453 19 
47 28 4,910,363 9 
48 113 4,953,931 10 
49 9 5,081,488 13 
50 61 5,158,058 33 
51 51 5,213,495 13 
52 144 5,239,616 3 
53 30 5,308,333 10 
54 55 5,311,018 16 
55 75 5,417,879 22 
56 177 5,430,074 5 
57 115 5,455,079 7 
58 132 5,546,321 12 
59 98 5,568,012 12 
60 63 5,606,824 13 
61 139 5,762,240 5 
62 116 5,776,201 17 
63 101 5,840,471 5 
64 68 5,849,842 27 
65 39 5,971,309 12 
66 69 6,431,575 12 
67 160 6,520,410 13 
68 50 6,577,772 19 
69 88 6,711,020 17 
70 112 6,926,366 21 
71 175 6,941,442 7 
72 82 6,993,996 22 
73 110 7,020,557 4 
74 96 7,052,495 14 
75 102 7,077,820 18 
76 78 7,138,917 24 
77 100 7,159,077 17 
78 2 7,195,958 19 
79 29 7,298,614 8 
80 81 7,316,638 25 
81 6 7,382,782 18 
82 70 7,753,293 13 
83 118 7,803,872 27 
84 87 8,316,816 19 
85 136 8,326,467 17 
86 137 8,503,542 15 
87 138 8,513,146 9 
88 92 8,651,503 17 
89 27 8,725,680 15 
90 67 8,829,614 6 
91 95 9,130,136 19 
92 35 9,157,789 13 
93 163 9,270,871 13 
94 120 9,376,634 18 
95 119 9,378,027 19 
96 168 9,888,951 14 
97 83 9,967,104 21 
98 129 10,116,512 7 
99 10 10,195,475 5 
100 90 10,238,717 12 
101 125 10,562,633 16 
102 58 11,002,658 22 
103 161 11,264,567 13 
104 59 11,352,444 30 
105 196 11,701,127 16 
Order ID Bm N 
    
106 7 11,798,922 4 
107 159 11,877,969 15 
108 162 11,879,965 12 
109 15 12,016,014 6 
110 114 12,219,982 11 
111 62 12,247,327 23 
112 57 12,310,844 29 
113 13 12,689,001 5 
114 143 12,743,941 6 
115 181 12,775,105 14 
116 24 12,813,902 6 
117 133 12,997,923 13 
118 131 13,082,183 19 
119 122 13,468,271 17 
120 12 14,089,689 4 
121 107 14,326,042 18 
122 84 14,740,774 35 
123 3 14,942,473 4 
124 157 14,987,988 4 
125 103 15,237,206 17 
126 155 15,376,482 9 
127 11 15,468,071 5 
128 4 15,492,985 9 
129 18 15,884,604 8 
130 66 16,001,038 19 
131 47 16,142,432 22 
132 46 17,270,516 19 
133 14 17,600,051 4 
134 20 18,052,061 5 
135 17 18,261,285 3 
136 56 18,510,902 13 
137 33 19,017,916 11 
138 97 19,580,746 15 
139 145 19,682,885 15 
140 180 19,820,731 19 
141 195 20,329,081 22 
142 111 20,482,778 13 
143 73 2,056,7519 13 
144 52 20,763,266 22 
145 93 20,987,071 17 
146 89 21,721,427 24 
147 5 21,897,525 8 
148 71 22,005,460 19 
149 8 22,005,595 9 
150 149 22,273,687 7 
151 25 22,523,145 10 
152 49 22,792,215 16 
153 142 23,374,497 9 
154 121 24,397,705 12 
155 172 24,736,322 6 
156 166 25,553,436 22 
157 31 25,691,639 7 
158 169 26,488,553 14 
159 41 26,866,865 12 
160 150 29,074,170 9 
161 194 29,158,901 14 
162 186 31,219,182 11 
163 188 32,162,193 12 
164 189 32,320,613 17 
165 23 32,466,204 8 
166 182 32,504,745 9 
167 151 32,836,424 5 
168 146 32,898,259 8 
169 192 33,442,044 20 
170 174 34,477,446 7 
171 185 34,966,263 11 
172 184 35,050,955 17 
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173 127 35,470,407 13 
174 99 36,150,477 12 
175 147 37,571,271 10 
176 108 39,589,743 8 
177 193 39,629,959 12 
178 179 40,797,771 11 
179 167 43,470,348 17 
180 198 45,444,698 15 
181 153 45,638,843 2 
182 165 45,827,899 15 
183 54 50,844,928 14 
184 164 51,272,832 3 
185 197 52,622,753 15 
186 170 54,801,234 16 
187 171 55,467,234 9 
188 135 58,550,982 7 
189 148 60,559,950 6 
190 190 61,415,292 12 
191 178 61,650,136 12 
192 187 62,332,752 12 
193 183 64,564,247 16 
194 152 66,006,552 2 
195 199 72,353,464 17 
196 191 72,488,422 20 
197 154 85,998,385 7 
198 156 89,072,086 4 
199 141 122,432,544 10 
Dataset 8 
1 235 9,686,030 16 
2 237 11,293,063 27 
3 240 11,841,023 24 
4 259 12,117,616 11 
5 261 13,887,971 14 
6 250 14,783,092 7 
7 245 15,132,109 12 
8 234 15,741,697 18 
9 133 15,837,168 8 
10 244 18,823,189 22 
11 142 19,870,200 6 
12 241 20,302,245 19 
13 215 20,412,549 17 
14 209 20,579,837 24 
15 202 20,750,492 17 
16 208 21,005,604 16 
17 189 21,872,827 8 
18 220 22,830,562 6 
19 1 22,905,464 4 
20 251 23,202,525 29 
21 151 23,288,908 9 
22 200 23,399,980 18 
23 219 23,644,428 27 
24 197 24,511,056 10 
25 132 24,630,300 10 
26 258 25,298,293 8 
27 183 25,428,526 11 
28 191 25,709,445 8 
29 184 25,905,435 17 
30 162 26,007,830 15 
31 139 26,314,349 7 
32 84 26,417,821 3 
33 174 26,600,432 5 
34 76 26,950,453 10 
35 238 27,447,056 25 
36 236 28,108,553 20 
37 92 28,415,299 9 
38 169 28,525,712 10 
39 172 28,533,663 9 
Order ID Bm N 
    
40 60 28,986,427 10 
41 167 29,264,893 14 
42 176 29,270,416 8 
43 199 29,557,430 13 
44 130 29,737,681 22 
45 54 30,218,068 14 
46 56 30,289,323 10 
47 127 30,634,246 12 
48 131 31,576,756 14 
49 185 32,309,757 9 
50 158 32,405,302 10 
51 5 32,648,679 8 
52 20 32,798,912 8 
53 77 33,010,313 5 
54 230 33,671,263 20 
55 123 33,672,702 17 
56 120 33,797,575 9 
57 246 33,797,664 16 
58 126 34,458,393 4 
59 217 35,026,179 27 
60 121 35,564,261 6 
61 224 35,893,943 33 
62 134 35,948,491 16 
63 47 36,231,371 15 
64 22 36,419,133 7 
65 50 36,646,493 8 
66 252 37,391,261 24 
67 201 37,397,035 11 
68 64 37,899,102 6 
69 211 39,268,954 20 
70 216 39,983,159 10 
71 87 40,034,426 15 
72 193 40,219,489 11 
73 148 40,267,410 11 
74 119 41,142,768 5 
75 179 41,703,108 18 
76 88 42,240,240 9 
77 228 42,500,698 25 
78 63 44,257,298 6 
79 71 44,609,273 6 
80 94 45,711,952 12 
81 248 46,018,107 16 
82 147 47,518,324 6 
83 90 48,189,273 7 
84 186 48,423,414 12 
85 247 48,617,410 29 
86 118 49,059,223 13 
87 16 49,274,964 7 
88 42 49,532,531 9 
89 72 49,620,702 7 
90 11 49,906,898 16 
91 70 50,643,989 5 
92 154 50,698,846 21 
93 157 50,821,541 12 
94 239 50,991,436 26 
95 253 51,057,579 28 
96 214 52,415,737 22 
97 45 52,632,198 13 
98 89 53,244,674 16 
99 256 53,312,678 22 
100 99 53,501,390 9 
101 52 54,063,116 12 
102 124 54,071,508 20 
103 86 54,307,385 10 
104 38 54,644,554 16 
105 68 54,947,923 7 
106 204 55,416,740 13 
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107 105 55,716,395 20 
108 156 55,825,133 12 
109 225 56,276,136 23 
110 58 56,972,579 5 
111 24 57,185,850 17 
112 229 57,530,816 23 
113 9 58,034,490 7 
114 75 58,361,917 4 
115 80 58,799,099 5 
116 107 59,274,762 15 
117 178 59,701,239 23 
118 187 59,781,748 15 
119 106 60,221,650 16 
120 12 60,389,249 8 
121 180 60,572,413 8 
122 213 60,608,254 25 
123 59 61,792,701 3 
124 13 62,439,050 7 
125 255 63,922,601 12 
126 152 64,261,762 11 
127 218 66,605,605 32 
128 61 66,743,092 18 
129 57 66,803,823 5 
130 78 66,871,052 5 
131 155 67,194,397 9 
132 164 67,282,323 10 
133 188 67,412,187 13 
134 165 68,163,986 30 
135 260 68,287,273 18 
136 15 68,563,040 9 
137 91 69,701,410 7 
138 83 70,627,860 19 
139 254 70,641,167 12 
140 181 71,010,773 24 
141 227 72,986,042 23 
142 79 73,933,651 7 
143 30 74,013,304 15 
144 41 74,912,322 13 
145 210 74,976,914 22 
146 243 75,146,431 24 
147 36 75,449,647 13 
148 21 77,530,258 16 
149 32 78,650,299 13 
150 35 79,089,305 17 
151 8 79,826,297 8 
152 31 79,827,787 6 
153 49 81,034,245 6 
154 128 81,153,956 20 
155 26 82,222,571 10 
156 222 83,688,694 21 
157 182 84,855,011 18 
158 33 86,729,872 16 
159 18 86,952,841 5 
160 19 89,469,514 6 
161 34 90,922,565 5 
162 137 91,374,772 14 
163 166 91,485,441 24 
164 37 92,341,007 14 
165 29 92,950,923 9 
166 85 97,406,505 5 
167 98 97,406,505 5 
168 194 97,823,404 24 
169 14 98,579,660 7 
170 168 98,937,736 7 
171 136 99,541,286 33 
172 10 100,187,412 8 
173 103 103,429,075 10 
Order ID Bm N 
    
174 17 103,983,088 6 
175 146 104,620,712 26 
176 69 107,124,675 7 
177 108 107,674,517 8 
178 173 108,191,498 18 
179 23 108,478,803 9 
180 104 108,611,921 19 
181 62 108,676,000 6 
182 198 110,295,802 29 
183 161 111,843,652 26 
184 40 113,779,940 9 
185 125 118,831,902 26 
186 28 119,642,127 20 
187 48 121,431,073 17 
188 43 121,746,843 16 
189 203 121,986,939 24 
190 171 123,091,301 23 
191 140 123,995,149 6 
192 145 124,745,749 17 
193 65 128,059,822 19 
194 27 135,274,596 13 
195 25 137,137,793 6 
196 102 142,048,216 15 
197 257 143,181,832 15 
198 232 144,232,980 28 
199 177 148,663,307 7 
200 44 155,298,815 7 
201 160 156,082,500 30 
202 109 163,036,576 7 
203 149 163,494,651 26 
204 82 165,624,964 17 
205 144 170,840,390 18 
206 7 173,415,798 9 
207 242 179,628,219 29 
208 195 182,766,423 20 
209 112 184,288,849 19 
210 221 186,059,008 15 
211 3 202,157,572 6 
212 192 210,812,717 21 
213 110 216,120,285 13 
214 95 219,223,842 9 
215 39 227,133,200 19 
216 141 234,240,839 14 
217 143 235,532,709 14 
218 159 239,737,552 27 
219 2 241,470,617 10 
220 153 244,991,457 20 
221 206 248,566,380 16 
222 226 254,121,267 26 
223 175 267,003,262 21 
224 212 294,573,317 25 
225 196 299,376,262 23 
226 207 302,313,596 8 
227 223 303,930,143 32 
228 97 307,544,521 13 
229 113 326,782,705 13 
230 129 328,810,633 13 
231 163 337,645,719 6 
232 150 355,975,318 6 
233 115 388,346,117 13 
234 116 408,575,647 13 
235 46 429,568,372 7 
236 66 430,091,931 13 
237 117 432,859,750 13 
238 205 433,573,963 18 
239 170 452,587,145 9 
240 81 454,563,758 7 
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241 114 459,617,877 13 
242 67 461,704,853 16 
243 51 476,863,622 4 
244 233 515,945,074 5 
245 249 519,046,161 5 
246 93 533,161,986 8 
247 135 533,736,354 7 
248 96 535,932,449 4 
249 55 551,801,748 7 
250 101 555,152,362 5 
251 6 607,350,915 7 
252 73 617,039,057 5 
253 231 627,736,136 10 
254 100 631,070,960 5 
255 111 641,501,137 6 
256 138 736,914,373 9 
257 190 744,383,266 22 
258 122 788,351,471 4 
259 4 1,124,639,280 4 
260 53 1,158,986,282 5 
261 74 1,426,001,288 7 
Dataset 9 
1 103 56,732 5 
2 120 73,266 6 
3 122 130,801 5 
4 43 132,303 5 
5 102 158,165 3 
6 17 180,258 4 
7 121 206,217 4 
8 19 223,148 5 
9 32 225,299 4 
10 10 227,450 9 
11 9 232,775 3 
12 13 242,106 5 
13 33 244,931 7 
14 44 252,145 6 
15 51 273,722 5 
16 125 276,239 4 
17 150 300,408 14 
18 69 310,137 5 
19 53 315,973 12 
20 30 339,635 4 
21 6 342,653 8 
22 54 350,364 16 
23 18 358,884 5 
24 4 372,150 3 
25 29 377,694 6 
26 1 381,391 4 
27 76 386,393 10 
28 82 388,131 16 
29 12 390,904 8 
30 56 391,853 15 
31 77 392,145 9 
32 3 402,472 7 
33 81 411,205 15 
34 111 428,339 6 
35 14 430,338 3 
36 7 436,690 7 
37 57 447,253 10 
38 22 455,859 6 
39 66 460,510 6 
40 148 465,701 17 
41 151 474,516 13 
42 65 482,462 8 
43 55 499,372 16 
44 79 507,584 5 
45 106 512,374 6 
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46 37 512,818 5 
47 80 517,141 8 
48 68 522,296 11 
49 118 531,660 4 
50 137 532,393 7 
51 70 547,753 10 
52 52 550,140 21 
53 41 567,554 7 
54 31 582,819 3 
55 24 594,703 7 
56 25 599,392 7 
57 149 642,660 11 
58 45 649,360 10 
59 61 651,707 18 
60 87 657,234 15 
61 62 660,565 10 
62 58 675,993 6 
63 88 701,171 10 
64 75 701,751 5 
65 109 707,188 5 
66 73 708,362 17 
67 49 711,578 16 
68 63 725,123 12 
69 26 727,673 6 
70 78 734,618 6 
71 60 741,877 17 
72 23 751,431 9 
73 20 751,973 3 
74 48 805,337 10 
75 95 837,791 3 
76 39 840,343 6 
77 96 871,212 4 
78 89 884,565 7 
79 126 890,228 10 
80 84 924,607 14 
81 110 944,857 11 
82 112 947,843 9 
83 74 983,520 9 
84 15 1,023,110 3 
85 114 1,058,313 8 
86 64 1,075,612 11 
87 152 1,119,235 10 
88 71 1,124,010 9 
89 101 1,129,887 5 
90 40 1,132,020 5 
91 72 1,168,567 10 
92 46 1,176,415 4 
93 8 1,240,503 10 
94 127 1,254,329 7 
95 146 1,284,611 18 
96 83 1,314,678 9 
97 21 1,327,789 3 
98 91 1,359,160 9 
99 104 1,362,291 18 
100 34 1,379,128 5 
101 100 1,404,513 6 
102 67 1,416,992 10 
103 113 1,526,470 7 
104 129 1,602,781 11 
105 133 1,605,577 8 
106 97 1,624,700 12 
107 135 1,750,689 5 
108 132 1,771,181 6 
109 124 1,962,038 12 
110 92 2,141,937 17 
111 5 2,153,301 9 
112 141 2,202,905 6 
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113 27 2,363,846 8 
114 38 2,508,048 9 
115 2 2,561,172 9 
116 107 3,001,627 7 
117 59 3,006,421 13 
118 16 3,445,830 9 
119 140 3,457,929 5 
120 99 3,589,080 9 
121 134 3,606,215 11 
122 85 3,634,841 6 
123 138 3,710,882 6 
124 136 3,731,703 12 
125 50 3,746,593 10 
126 130 3,754,805 11 
127 123 3,758,103 12 
128 28 3,806,591 5 
129 115 3,847,477 9 
130 86 3,947,517 13 
131 119 4,069,052 14 
132 36 4,327,794 3 
133 131 4,407,398 10 
134 98 4,499,075 8 
135 117 4,548,821 10 
136 128 4,612,678 9 
137 105 4,637,181 8 
138 35 4,778,909 3 
139 147 5,008,153 14 
140 42 5,281,779 4 
141 139 5,313,098 8 
142 94 6,372,181 13 
143 47 6,478,101 13 
144 108 7,248,956 10 
145 93 8,573,757 10 
146 90 8,846,539 15 
147 145 10,041,043 6 
148 143 10,041,371 11 
149 142 10,902,881 12 
150 144 12,104,566 10 
151 116 13,685,053 8 
152 11 14,674,315 10 
Dataset 10 
1 154 8,587 9 
2 161 8,919 8 
3 122 9,582 5 
4 158 9,586 18 
5 156 11,159 4 
6 130 11,903 11 
7 47 11,981 4 
8 160 11,989 15 
9 68 12,108 3 
10 157 12,257 18 
11 79 12,917 3 
12 159 14,873 13 
13 127 24,736 7 
14 126 27,070 8 
15 46 27,290 6 
16 124 27,357 7 
17 52 28,229 4 
18 31 29,644 4 
19 93 31,418 3 
20 4 31,602 4 
21 34 32,298 3 
22 38 33,132 3 
23 39 33,132 3 
24 53 34,075 4 
25 128 34,621 6 
26 32 34,785 5 
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27 33 35,838 8 
28 153 36,136 9 
29 1 36,406 5 
30 75 37,130 7 
31 119 38,501 5 
32 155 39,087 6 
33 112 39,092 5 
34 129 39,623 9 
35 25 42,790 5 
36 91 44,749 7 
37 26 48,035 4 
38 28 48,104 7 
39 37 51,107 5 
40 23 51,411 7 
41 3 59,141 4 
42 49 60,871 6 
43 80 62,909 10 
44 70 63,753 5 
45 35 67,006 5 
46 97 67,851 5 
47 77 69,098 5 
48 125 69,972 7 
49 50 74,176 6 
50 78 76,067 8 
51 41 79,709 4 
52 62 80,054 7 
53 43 80,104 2 
54 76 80,332 5 
55 139 81,413 6 
56 29 82,727 4 
57 82 84,454 14 
58 51 87,037 10 
59 27 87,929 13 
60 131 89,418 6 
61 30 94,961 10 
62 94 96,562 4 
63 134 98,450 6 
64 150 102,114 3 
65 132 102,160 6 
66 152 102,360 4 
67 108 102,996 11 
68 14 103,907 4 
69 12 104,142 6 
70 7 105,308 6 
71 137 106,113 5 
72 36 107,088 7 
73 2 108,485 5 
74 110 108,806 6 
75 123 111,326 8 
76 81 112,051 3 
77 84 112,104 5 
78 135 112,547 6 
79 48 112,868 4 
80 24 113,926 10 
81 141 114,969 5 
82 144 116,525 4 
83 87 119,033 5 
84 66 120,156 8 
85 17 122,317 5 
86 111 123,475 9 
87 69 126,872 8 
88 136 127,880 6 
89 90 128,207 5 
90 42 131,595 5 
91 45 131,750 2 
92 54 134,590 10 
93 121 136,802 3 
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94 44 137,428 5 
95 145 138,328 9 
96 18 140,514 5 
97 73 144,143 5 
98 148 144,165 6 
99 116 151,571 4 
100 22 155,400 4 
101 15 162,267 4 
102 13 162,467 6 
103 40 164,516 13 
104 21 166,160 8 
105 151 167,233 5 
106 64 169,798 7 
107 72 170,011 6 
108 106 173,237 6 
109 10 175,457 3 
110 16 180,415 7 
111 149 184,394 4 
112 20 187,599 6 
113 101 195,421 6 
114 138 198,183 6 
115 117 202,766 3 
116 133 206,866 8 
117 95 208,540 3 
118 104 211,821 4 
119 5 220,093 5 
120 114 229,196 4 
121 8 236,497 6 
122 83 244,161 3 
123 113 245,606 2 
124 86 272,561 7 
125 140 274,551 6 
126 120 285,500 5 
127 65 296,019 11 
128 74 313,076 6 
129 56 314,483 9 
130 118 343,941 11 
131 92 346,422 5 
132 11 355,518 7 
133 146 359,106 10 
134 59 363,022 3 
135 103 374,287 3 
136 60 377,712 7 
137 67 380,539 4 
138 85 381,766 5 
139 96 382,789 5 
140 99 389,007 5 
141 19 421,600 4 
142 115 449,603 8 
143 88 455,400 5 
144 63 459,292 9 
145 142 474,916 7 
146 61 475,413 5 
147 100 508,394 3 
148 57 515,450 8 
149 89 525,365 6 
150 58 531,609 6 
151 147 538,566 7 
152 71 547,322 8 
153 109 611,131 8 
154 107 732,683 7 
155 98 734,439 4 
156 55 924,217 16 
157 6 1,005,086 6 
158 143 1,237,836 8 
159 105 1,775,726 6 
160 102 1,857,215 6 
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161 9 3,260,798 8 
Dataset 11 
1 4 122,657 3 
2 39 201,402 5 
3 11 229,253 11 
4 35 277,774 5 
5 3 287,515 14 
6 44 308,259 4 
7 17 364,765 18 
8 38 380,479 12 
9 26 433,576 9 
10 40 713,573 12 
11 6 713,584 5 
12 34 771,586 9 
13 2 775,167 4 
14 7 883,144 6 
15 31 987,694 3 
16 37 1,002,202 3 
17 10 1,077,819 25 
18 5 1,082,862 11 
19 42 1,243,280 20 
20 23 1,260,234 4 
21 22 1,275,801 19 
22 21 1,286,376 7 
23 32 1,616,923 6 
24 41 1,708,144 8 
25 43 1,764,662 11 
26 18 1,856,797 14 
27 25 2,179,868 25 
28 33 2,536,349 9 
29 45 2,612,412 5 
30 36 3,071,591 9 
31 9 3,080,428 10 
32 19 3,363,910 6 
33 8 3,885,370 22 
34 24 4,289,341 22 
35 29 4,749,403 9 
36 1 5,450,186 13 
37 27 5,719,436 16 
38 12 5,959,673 43 
39 20 6,062,617 45 
40 13 6,664,934 43 
41 28 6,927,068 10 
42 30 7,312,009 27 
43 16 8,625,632 39 
44 14 14,894,721 12 
45 15 18,027,863 23 
Dataset 12 
1 15 1,079,144 24 
2 28 1,488,330 21 
3 79 1,537,471 22 
4 31 1,612,499 24 
5 107 1,653,353 26 
6 37 2,103,391 19 
7 4 2,499,595 12 
8 41 2,626,856 24 
9 17 2,716,395 36 
10 26 2,960,181 22 
11 97 3,017,126 36 
12 108 3,063,002 33 
13 47 3,086,445 20 
14 114 3,195,185 48 
15 109 3,559,762 34 
16 16 3,682,856 45 
17 24 4,048,593 34 
18 94 4,198,634 45 
19 93 5,517,449 49 
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20 5 5,519,531 16 
21 112 5,582,020 22 
22 22 5,705,802 41 
23 100 6,534,653 16 
24 113 6,552,800 37 
25 105 7,001,062 16 
26 72 7,054,504 65 
27 95 8,389,273 40 
28 6 8,516,973 21 
29 101 8,852,925 15 
30 85 9,802,996 47 
31 38 10,495,291 50 
32 106 10,615,254 16 
33 46 10,816,891 39 
34 49 11,177,786 47 
35 40 11,488,513 49 
36 104 12,315,545 63 
37 84 14,132,357 44 
38 103 14,227,093 60 
39 64 14,341,530 23 
40 110 16,251,125 33 
41 99 16,860,295 10 
42 50 17,588,667 49 
43 111 17,746,139 25 
44 96 18,619,007 12 
45 34 19,595,731 42 
46 27 20,153,397 41 
47 59 20,561,970 59 
48 98 20,563,467 11 
49 3 21,353,568 30 
50 10 21,708,000 33 
51 63 22,143,465 23 
52 102 22,318,154 55 
53 51 26,479,141 31 
54 1 27,040,451 45 
55 55 27,910,450 52 
56 39 28,331,375 45 
57 61 29,000,444 41 
58 25 30,249,575 41 
59 2 30,551,542 45 
60 30 30,770,871 30 
61 12 31,590,763 36 
62 14 31,590,763 36 
63 69 33,210,700 39 
64 7 34,764,003 34 
65 45 35,455,363 41 
66 29 35,987,767 41 
67 71 39,283,078 30 
68 32 41,228,951 44 
69 65 41,597,001 40 
70 8 42,025,452 38 
71 33 42,092,509 46 
72 70 43,561,070 31 
73 54 45,077,325 37 
74 11 45,260,730 37 
75 43 45,925,278 41 
76 35 49,140,339 36 
77 60 49,876,103 37 
78 56 51,567,774 44 
79 9 51,730,833 33 
80 13 53,330,879 27 
81 73 56,420,628 33 
82 66 59,361,774 37 
83 75 59,997,000 29 
84 20 60,296,637 19 
85 42 62,189,663 35 
86 21 64,914,393 27 
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87 76 66,094,206 29 
88 48 69,184,189 39 
89 44 70,540,511 36 
90 57 71,468,346 33 
91 62 71,756,192 26 
92 19 74,858,840 19 
93 23 74,858,840 19 
94 77 75,413,556 24 
95 52 75,417,028 33 
96 90 78,509,325 24 
97 91 79,529,913 23 
98 67 82,812,206 30 
99 86 83,070,638 17 
100 74 83,210,900 26 
101 78 84,037,235 24 
102 87 87,245,462 17 
103 89 88,574,213 21 
104 92 88,614,685 21 
105 83 89,355,119 20 
106 80 91,994,522 19 
107 53 93,425,682 26 
108 81 95,744,520 19 
109 88 99,982,162 22 
110 36 101,166,388 18 
111 18 102,559,740 19 
112 82 112,041,174 20 
113 68 126,157,555 21 
114 58 158,509,777 18 
 
